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THE WAYWARD SERVICEMAN:




Under the guise of protecting the benefits of indictment by
grand jury and trial by petit jury for servicemen, on June 2, 1969,
the United. States Supreme Court set aside a rule of constitutional
law which had endured since the adoption of the Constitution by
the colonies. In a decision certain to have extensive consequences,
the Court in O'Callahan v. Parke1 held that the "status" of an
individual as a member of the armed forces does not, standing
alone, confer jurisdiction upon the military to prosecute that
individual for crimes committed while he is a member of the
armed forces. The principle which had clearly emerged after years
of challenge at its periphery suddenly tumbled.2
* Lieutenant, United States Naval Reserve, Judge Advocate General's Corps;
Member, State Bar of California, J.D., University of San Diego School of Law, 1967.
1. 395 U.S. 258 (1969). O'Callahan, an Army sergeant stationed in the then Territory
of Hawaii, was on evening leave in Honolulu on July 20, 1956. Dressed in civilian clothes,
he drank a few beers at a hotel bar, broke into the room of a young girl at the hotel,
assaulted and attempted to rape her. He was apprehended by a hotel security officer while
fleeing the victim's room and delivered to military authorities via the Honolulu police.
Convicted of attempted rape, house-breaking, and assault with attempt to rape by an
Army General Court-Martial, O'Callahan's sentence as finally approved on appeal by the
Court of Military Appeals consisted of imprisonment at hard labor for ten years, forfeiture
of all pay and allowances for a like period, and a dishonorable discharge. Habeas corpus
proceedings were denied in the District Court and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the armed forces had
jurisdiction to prosecute O'Callahan for crimes committed off-post while on leave and
alleged to have no military significance, thus depriving him of his constitutional rights to
indictment by a grand jury and trial by a petit jury in a civilian court. 395 U.S. at 260.
2. McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, Wilson v. Bohlender, 361 U.S. 281
(1960) (holding that military lacked jurisdiction to prosecute civilian employees of overseas
military forces for capital crimes); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S.
234 (1960) (holding that military lacked jurisdiction to prosecute civilian dependents of
overseas military personnel for non-capital crimes); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)
(holding that military lacked jurisdiction to prosecute civilian dependents of overseas
military personnel for capital crimes). "The test for jurisdiction, it follows, is one of status,
namely, whether the accused in the court-martial proceeding is a person who can be
regarded as falling within the term 'land and naval forces.'" Kinsella v. United States ex
rel. Singleton 361 U.S. at 240-41.
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The Court recognized that the Constitution provides
Congress with the power to "make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces."' 3 Further, the fifth
amendment exempts "cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger"' from the requirement of presentment or indictment by
grand jury and the right to trial by jury.' The Court's attention
focused immediately upon dicta in Toth v. Quarles,' questioning
the competency of military courts; it proceeded through a bitter
attack against the creation, composition, purposes and ability of
military courts regarding their capacity to deal with a defendant's
rights
3. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, 8.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V; 395 U.S. at 261.
5. 395 U.S. at 261; Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
6. 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955); 395 U.S. at 262-63. We' find nothing in the history of
constitutional treatment of military tribunals which entitled them to rank along with
Article III courts as adjudicators of the guilt or innocence of people charged with offenses
for which they can be deprived of their life, liberty or property. Unlike courts, it is the
primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the
occasion arise. But trial of soldiers to maintain discipline is merely incidental to any
army's primary fithting function. To the extent that those responsible for performance of
this primary function are diverted from it by the necessity of trying cases, the basic fighting
purpose of armies is not served. And conceding to military personnel that high degree of
honesty and sense of justice which nearly all of them undoubtedly have, it still remains
true that military tribunals have not been and probably never can be constituted in such
way that they can have the same kind of qualifications that the Constitution has deemed
essential to fair trials of civilians in federal courts. For instance, the Constitution does not
provide life tenure for those performing judicial functions in military trials. They are
appointed by military commanders and may be removed at will. Nor does the Constitution
protect their salaries as it does judicial salaries. Strides have been made toward making
courts-martial less subject to the will of the executive department which appoints,
supervises and ultimately controls them. Bit from the very nature of things, courts have
more independence in passing on the life and liberty of people than do military tribunals.
7. Singled out in particular and condemned by the Court were the following areas:
The require ent that courts-martial be composed of military personnel normally acting
by twDA iirds vote; the practice of having a military law officer, whose objectivity and
-independence the Court questioned; differences in rules of evidence and procedure in
military trials; the possibility of influence by the officer convening the court; the position
of military courts as part of the overall mechanism preserving military discipline; an
alleged less favorable attitude toward defendants in the interests of national defense; an
alleged ineptness on the part of the military courts to deal with the "nice subtleties" of
constitutional law; and, an allegation of "vagueness" of criminal provisos marking the
military trials by "the age-old manifest destiny of retributive justice." 395 U.S. at 263-
66. It is interesting to note the Court's complete lack of citations to military cases dealing
with constitutional rights, and the citing by the majority opinion of only two military
cases, the latest of which was decided in 1964. Unfortunately, the dissent also cited only
two military cases, both fifteen years old, and neither of which touched upon constitutional
rights.
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Interspersed with a lengthy review of early American and
British military law, the Court concluded that "status" as a
member of the armed forces on active duty at the time of the
offense and at the time of trial is no longer determinative of court-
martial jurisdiction in the absence of factors disclosing the crime
to be "service-connected." '8 Admittedly, the decision mirrored the
Court's desire to prevent the fifth amendment's exemption
regarding "cases arising in the land and naval forces" from
depriving a member of the armed forces of the "benefits of an
indictment by a grand jury and a trial by a jury of his peers."'
The opinion expressed a lingering doubt concerning the
competency of military courts to effectively protect a serviceman-
defendant's constitutional rights. Analyzing the factors existing in
the instant case,10 the Court determined that the crime was not
"service-connected" and accordingly reversed the military
conviction. The following discussion is an attempt to rebut what
the author considers unjustified criticigm -of the military justice
system.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS SEEN THROUGH THE EYES OF
THE MILITARY
A. Advise of Counsel
A most viable issue presented to the American judicial system
recently is the sixth amendment protection concerning advice as
to the right to counsel. Miranda v. Arizona" is renowned for its
holdings regarding the adequacy of warnings given,'12 the definition
8. 395 U.S. at 267.
9. Id. at 272-73.
10. Factors considered important in determining the degree of "service-connection"
in O'Callahan's case were: (1) no connection between O'Callahan's military duties and the
crimes in question; (2) the crimes were not committed on a military post or enclave; (3)
the victim was not performing any duties related to the military; (4) the situs of the crimes
were not an armed camp under military control; (5) the offenses were peacetime offenses
and not connected with the war power; (6) civil courts were open; (7) the crimes were
committed within American territorial limits, rather than in an occupied zone of a foreign
country; and (8) the offenses did not involve any question of the flouting of military
authority, the security of a military post, or the integrity of military property. 395 U.S.
at 273-74.
11. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
12. "IT]he person must be warned . ..that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. at 444. The individual "must be clearly
informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him
during the interrogation. ... Id. at 471.
1970]
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of custodial interrogation,'13 and the definition of waiver."
The military counterpart to Miranda is United States v.
Tempia. 5 The Tempia court found a custodial interrogation
present, 6 an invalid warning given relative to the right to counsel,
and lack of a knowing and intelligent waiver by the accused.
Although the Tempia decision was not announced until April of
1967, the Court of Military Appeals applied the Miranda rulings
retroactively to military cases from the effective date of the
Miranda decision.18 Tempia's trial had begun one day following
the effective date of Miranda.
The military has dealt with challenges directed at the wording
of the warning of the right to counsel since Tempia; the Supreme
Court has not yet had the occasion to grapple with this problem."
13. The test is not whether the accused has technically been taken into custody but,
absent that, whether he has been "otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." Id. at 444.
14. "The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Id.
15. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967), expressly overruling the prior
military rule of United States v. Wimberly, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 36 C.M.R. 159 (1966). See
Addlestone and Wynne, Miranda and Military Justice, I I JAG L. REv. 223 (1969); Note,
17 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 537 (1968); Wheeler, A Suspect's Right to Counsel, 22 JAG J.
85 (1968); Hansen, Miranda and the Military Development of a Constitutional Right, 42
MIL. L. REV. 55 (1968); Comment, 36 U. CIN. L. REV. 472 (1967); Comment, 13 VILL,
L. REV. 170 (1967).
16.
In the military, unlike civil life, a suspect may be required to report and submit
to questioning quite without regard to warrants or other legal process. It
ignores the realities of that situation to say that one ordered to appear for
interrogation has not been significantly deprived of his freedom of action.
16 U.S.C.M.A. at 636, 37 C.M.R. at 256. See Section II(B), infra, dealing with self-
incrimination, for a discussion of "custodial interrogation."
17. The Court of Military Appeals found that -the accused confessed because he was
frustrated in his attempts to obtain legal advice, saying, in referring to his conversations
with a military lawyer who professed his unavailability to advise Tempia: "They didn't
do me no good." No other lawyers were available to speak to the accused. 17 U.S.C.M.A.
at 638, 37 C.M.R. at 258.
18. United States v. Swift, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 227, 38 C.M.R. 25 (1967). See Johnson
v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (holding Miranda applicable only to cases in which
trial had begun after Miranda was announced, June 13, 1966); see also Jenkins v.
Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (1969) (holding Miranda inapplicable to a retrial of defendant
whose original trial commenced prior to June 13, 1966).
19. See Frazier v. Cupp, 285 U.S. 731 (1969). Frazier involved a pre-Miranda factual
situation which would have been summarily reversed had the Miranda rulings been
applicable. The defendant had remarked during the interrogation: "I think I had better
get a lawyer before-I talk any more. I am going to get into trouble more than I am in
now." The interrogator, considering the statement as merely a passing remark, replied:
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Without exception, the Court of Military Appeals has reversed
convictions obtained through the use of confessions where the
accused was not adequately advised of his right to counsel. This
situation has most often arisen in the areas of appointed military
counsel free of charge and advice regarding the right to have
counsel present during the interrogation.20  When one of the
essential elements of a warning is missing, it is apparent; when the
wording of the warning is challenged, the problem is more
complex. Use of the word "counsel," as opposed to "lawyer" or
"attorney" has been upheld on the theory that specific words are
not necessary so long as the meaning is properly conveyed' While
"counsel" has been held acceptable, the same does not hold true
"You can't be in any more trouble than you are in now," and questioning continued. Id.
at 738. Miranda would have required reversal since "[]f. . . [a suspect] indicates in any
manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before
speaking there can be no questioning." 384 U.S. at 444-45. The Supreme Court found
Frazier's request ambiguous within the rule of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964),
and admitted the confession using the "totality of the circumstances" rule of Clewis v.
Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967). See Section II (B), infra, dealing with self-incrimination.
20. United States v. Sack, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 50, 51-52, 39 C.M.R. 50, 51-52 (1968)
(accused told of "right to legal counsel of his own choosing, and to have counsel present
during this interview" but not advised that if he did not wish to hire his own attorney at
his own expense, he would be entitled to an appointed lawyer free of charge); United States
v. Robertson and Thompson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 604, 38 C.M.R. 402 (1968) (warning failed
to advise that military counsel.was available free of charge and that counsel might be
present during interrogation); United States v. Bearchild, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 598, 38 C.M.R.
396 (1968) (no mention of appointed counsel); United States v. Bosley, 17 U.S.C.M.A.
350, 38 C.M.R. 148 (1967) (no mention of appointed counsel or counsel's presence during
interview); United States v. Gehmlich, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 345, 38 C.M.R. 143, 144 (1967)
(suspect told only that he "could consult with counsel and have counsel present at the time
of the interview"); United States v. Groover, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 295, 38 C.M.R. 93 (1967)
(suspect told only "of his right to consult with legal counsel and to have legal counsel
present" during interrogation); United States v. Wood, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 257, 38 C.M.R.
55 (1967) (no mention of "appointed military counsel"); United States v. Pearson, 17
U.S.C.M.A. 204, 37 C.M.R. 468 (1967) (holding "wholly inadequate" a warning that the
accused could get "legal assistance" from the Judge Advocate's Office or representation
by civilian counsel at his own expense without mention that a "military lawyer would be
provided free of charge" or that he could have counsel present during interrogation);
United States v. Roan, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 163, 37 C.M.R. 427 (1967) (no mention of right
to have counsel present during the interrogation); United States v. Hardy and Beers, 17
U.S.C.M.A. 100, 37 C.M.R. 364 (1967) (no mention of appointed counsel or counsel's
presence during interrogation); United States v. McCauley, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 81, 37 C.M.R.
345 (1967) (no mention of appointed counsel or counsel's presence during interrogation);
United States v. Burns, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 39, 37 C.M.R. 303 (1967) (advised only of right
to "consult with legal counsel if you so desire").
21. United States v. Goldman, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 389, 40 C.M.R. 101 (1969)
(expressing preference for "lawyer" or "attorney," but accepting "counsel" inasmuch as
Miranda used all three interchangeably). See also United States v. Adams, 18 U.S.C.M.A.
439,40 C.M.R. 151 (1969) (conflict of testimony regarding the accused's understanding).
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for the phrase "qualified attorney" when otherwise undefined."2
The best explanation to date appears to be United States v.
Mfewborn,? holding that "[a]n advice which does not contain the
substance of the formula is inadequate . .. Specific words or
phrases, however, need not be used. In other words, it is not the
format, but the substance of the advice that matters. '24 44ewborn
accepted the "awkward" language of an interrogator who warned
the accused, not at the outset of the interview, but before it waxed
significant, that the accused could have "the service of an
attorney," that he "could go downtown and hire" a lawyer or
"military counsel" would be provided for him, and that he could
have an attorney "then and there. 2 5 The holding dispels any
doubts concerning whether substance shall rule over form in
determining the validity of warnings in the military. Thus, it
recognizes the practicalities involved in law enforcement,
providing an acceptable and reasonable standard.
As a means of insuring the protection of the rights
interpreted in Miranda, the Supreme Court held that once an
individual asks for an attorney, all questioning must cease until
the person being interrogated obtains an attorney. The military
first applied this constitutional proviso in United States v.
Solomon,2n holding that continued questioning by an agent after
the accused has made a request for counsel, and while another
agent sought to obtain counsel for him, rendered the statement
inadmissible.
A further Miranda requirement, that "[n]o amount of
circumstantial evidence that the person may have been aware of
this right will suffice to stand in its stead"28 was adopted in
22. United States v. Bearchild, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 598, 38 C.M.R. 396 (1968).
23. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 431,38 C.M.R. 229 (1968).
24. Id. at 233 and 435.
25. Id.
26. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must
cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an
opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any
subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he
indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his
decision to remain silent.
384 U.S. at 474. See United States v. Williams, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 518, 40 C.M.R. 230
(1969) (accused must be afforded counsel upon request during interrogation).
27. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 262, 38 C.M.R. 60 (1967).
28. 384 U.S. at 471-72.
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United States v. Stanley 9 The Court of Military Appeals found
evidence that the accused should have known of his right to free
appointed military counsel from information supposedly obtained
through orientation lectures, but held that such evidence would
not suffice to replace a showing on the record that the accused had
been adequately advised of his rights at the time of the
interrogation." Exculpatory statements, as well as incriminating
ones, have been held to be within the rule requiring a showing of
proper warnings prior to admitting the statements into evidenceY
The protection afforded by the Miranda-Tempia rulings extends
also to impeachment of the accused by his prior statements
2
However, a curious exception exists in military courts when the
impeachment is used not during the case in chief, but to impeach
the accused's testimony in extenuation and mitigation following
the determination of guilt, as found in United States v. Caiola3
Although the Caiola court found a "custodial interrogation" to
exist and no warnings given, the statement was allowed on the
theory that the second stage of a military trail, in which matters
relevant to sentencing are presented, did not have a civilian
counterpart. The accused, while a prisoner awaiting trial, was
asked on a stockade questionnaire if he wanted to return to duty.
His negative answer to the question was later used to impeach his
statements made in extenuation and mitigation at the trial.
Concurring opinions to the decision leave considerable doubt that
the decision will remain in effect, at least upon its own reasoning.
A reasonable exception to the Wiranda-Tempia requirements
has been carved out in the military. When the defense presents
testimony relative to the accused's mental condition, a government
expert witness is allowed to testify in rebuttal regarding his
29. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 384,38 C.M.R. 182 (1968).
30. See United States v. Goldman, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 389, 40 C.M.R. 101 (1969) (no
presumption exists that a valid warning was given); United States v. Hart, 17 U.S.C.M.A.
524, 38 C.M.R. 322 (1968) (government concession of error in admitting statement without
sufficient showing of proper advice); United States v. Keller, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 507, 38
C.M.R. 305 (1968) (burden on government to show proper warnings given beyond a
reasonable doubt; no presumption of valid warnings exists; not waived by failure of defense
to object); United States v. Gustafson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 150, 37 C.M.R. 414 (1967)
(absence of objection does not excuse failure of government to show valid warnings).
31. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1967); United States v. McCauley, 17
U.S.C.M.A. 81, 37 C.M.R. 345 (1967).
32. United States v. Butler, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 344, 38 C.M.R. 142 (1967); United
States v. Lincoln, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 330, 38 C.M.R. 128 (1967).
33. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 336,40 C.M.R. 48 (1969).
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conclusions as to the accused's mental condition, based upon
interviews with the accused conducted without advising the
accused of his right to counsel 4
A rather interesting innovation was added to military trials
in regard to advising the accused of his rights to counsel with
United States v. Donohew 5 The Court of Military Appeals held
in Donohew that every record of trial must contain an affirmative
declaration by the accused of his understanding of his entitlement
to civilian counsel of his own choice at his own expense, his right
to military counsel free of charge, his right to military counsel of
his choice if reasonably available, and his consent to the absence
of any assistant defense counsel not actually present in court but
listed on the appointing order3
The question of waiver has also been litigated in the Court
of Military Appeals since the Miranda and Tempia decisions. The
result has been a careful adherence to the standards of the
Supreme Court as described in Miranda, requiring a voluntary,
knowing and intelligent waiver of the rights to counsel.37
Understandably, a waiver was found when the accused did not
object at trial to the admission of a statement obtained after a
defective warning, and then cross-examined the interrogator
concerning the content of the statement 8
To date, the military has not had occasion to deal with the
issue of counsel at "line-ups." If the recent decisions of the Court
of Military Appeals are any indication at all, the military
34. United States v. Wilson, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 400, 40 C.M.R. 112 (1969). See United
States v. Schell, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 410, 40 C.M.R. 122 (1969); United States v. Babbidge,
18 U.S.C.M.A. 327,40 C.M.R. 39 (1969).
35. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 149, 39 C.M.R. 149 (1969).
36. See United States v. Koren, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 513, 38 C.M.R. 311 (1968) (holding
accused's express statement in record of trial that he was to be defended by a named officer
a waiver of the presence and services of two others listed on the appointing order as defense
counsel). See also United States v. Hartfield, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 269, 38 C.M.R. 67 (1967),
and United States v. Mitchell, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 516, 36 C.M.R. 14 (1965), relative to the
question of availability of requested military counsel, and United States v. Perez, 18
U.S.C.M.A. 24, 39 C.M.R. 24 (1968), and United States v. Potter, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 118,
33 C.M.R. 330 (1963), relative to the right to obtain civilian defense counsel.
37. United States v. Stanley, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 384, 38 C.M.R. 182 (1968). The Stanley
record of trial was silent regarding whether the accused knowingly and intelligently waived
his rights to counsel. The sole evidence was: "Q. Did you inform him that he might have
a lawyer present either civilian -or military. A. Yes, Sir." In addition, the accused said
"[h]e further advised me that I may have legal counsel who may be present during the
questioning." 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 385, 38 C.M.R. at 183.
38. United States v. Gustafson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 150, 37 C.M.R. 414 (1967).
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presumably will follow the Supreme Court in determining line-ups
to be "critical stages" of prosecution at which the accused is
entitled to the aid of counsel? 9 The military has also moved into
the area of searches, proclaiming that no warnings regarding
counsel or self-incrimination are necessary when seeking the
consent of a suspect for a search' Handwriting exemplars have
been held exempt by the Supreme Court from the requirement of
warnings on the theory that they do not constitute a "critical
stage" of the criminal proceedings, but rather are "identifying
physical characteristics" as distinguished from the contents of a
writing.41 In contrast, the military affords the. suspect all warnings
regarding self-incrimination when dealing with handwriting
exemplars, but has held that the warnings regarding right to
counsel are not applicable.4
B. Advice as to Self-Incrimination
Miranda requires that, in addition to warnings concerning
counsel, at the outset of any custodial interrogation the suspect
be advised "that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him,
'43
and that "[i]f the individual indicates in any manner, at any time
39. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967), and Golbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). See also Foster v. California, 394
U.S. 440 (1969), where the defendant was first placed in a line-up with considerably shorter
men, and, after no positive identification was made, a one-to-one confrontation with the
robbery victim was arranged. After only a tentative identification at the confrontation, a
subsequent line-up was conducted in which the defendant was the only person who had
also been in the first line-up. Holding Wade and Gilbert inapplicable since Foster had
occurred before the former decisions, the Supreme Court nevertheless reversed the
conviction based on the rationale of Sto vall, holding that "judged by the 'totality of
circumstances,' the conduct of identification procedures may be 'so unnecessarily
suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification' as to be a denial of due
process of law." 394 U.S. at 442.
40. United States v. Rushing, 17 U.S. M.C.A. 298, 38 C.M.R. 96 (1967). See Gorman
v. United States, 380 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1968); State v. Forney, 181 Neb. 757, 150 N.W.
2d 915 (1967); State v. McCarty, 199 Kan. 116, 427 P.2d 616 (1967). Nor are warnings a
necessary prerequisite to a search incident to an arrest. United States v. Coakley, 18
U.S.C.M.A. 511,40 C.M.R. 223 (1969).
41. Gilbert v. California, supra, note 39.
42. United States v. Lewis, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 355, 40 C.M.R. 67 (1969). Lewis upheld
a conviction based in part upon the taking of a handwriting exemplar by an agent who
warned the accused properly except that the accused was told: "'If you want an attorney
now, I have no provision to furnish you one. You are only entitled to a court appointed
attorney at the time the matter should go to the court.'" Id. at 357. See Section 11 (B),
infra, dealing with self-incrimination for further discussion of handwriting exemplars.
43. 384 U.S. at 444.
1970]
SAN DIEGO LA W REVIEW [Vol. 7
prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the
interrogation must cease."44 Tempia bound the military to the
Miranda formulae as constitutional criteria. 5 However, long
before Miranda was decided, the military had been bound by the
requirements of the renown "Article 3 1,"4 which is broader than
Miranda in that warnings are required to be given in more depth,
limitations are placed upon the type of questions to be asked, and
the conditions under which statements may be rendered
inadmissible are clearly defined 7 The military has again adhered
to Miranda by requiring interrogators to comply with the wishes
of the accused's desire to terminate questioning." Furthermore,
the government is required to show beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused did not in any manner indicate that he did not
wish to be interrogated. 9
In United States v. Schlonann,0 the court allowed the use
44. Id. at 473-74.
45. 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 635, 37 C.M.R. at 255.
46. 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1956). Compulsory Self-incrimination prohibited:
Article 31
(a). No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to incriminate
himself or to answer any question the answer to which may tend to incriminate
him.
(b) No person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request any
statement from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first
informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does
not have to make any statement regarding the offenses of which he is accused
or suspected and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence
against him in a trial by court-martial.
(c) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to make a
statement or produce evidence before any military tribunal if the statement or
evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to degrade him.
(d) No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article, or
through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement may
be received in evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.
47. See United States v. Green and Hamilton, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 300, 35 C.M.R. 272
(1965) (must find that means used by investigator did not vitiate the effect of the § 831,
Article 31 warning given).
48. United States v. Bollons, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 253, 38 C.M.R. 51 (1967). Bollons was
advised of his rights and answered several statements by saying he didn't want to make
any statements that could be used against him or incriminate him, but he apparently
answered some questions when the interrogators continued to ask questions, resulting in a
fatal defect in the conviction.
49. United States v. Landrum, 17 U.S.C.VI.A. 526, 38 C.M.R. 324 (1968); United
States v. Guy, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 609, 38 C.M.R. 407 (1968); United States v. King, 14
U.S.C.M.A. 227, 34 C.M.R. 7 (1963) (burden on government to show the giving of Article
31 warnings even before Miranda).
50. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 414, 37 C.M.R. 34 (1966).
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of the accused's prior statement to civilian authorities who had
not warned him in accordance with the requirements of Article 31,
not required in civilian courts, on the theory that the civilian
interrogator was not acting in furtherance of a military
investigation at the time. And, in United States v. Reynolds,51 the
court struck down a statement made to a military investigator
who asked the accused what he had done while on an
unauthorized absence when the response was incriminating. The
basis was that the investigator had not advised the accused of
what crime he was suspected as required by Article 31. United
States v. D'Arco52 admitted the statement of a serviceman made
to the FBI, although no Article 31 warnings were given, on the
theory that the FBI acted on its own initiative following receipt
of information from a military member who elected to contact the
FBI rather than military authorities. United States v. Elliott3
found error in admitting into evidence a statement made by the
accused following a defective Article 31 warning. The interrogator
advised the suspect that he could refuse to answer only if he was
guilty of something, that the accused should say nothing if
involved, but, if the accused was only a witness, he was required
to testify upon being asked or suffer a court-martial.
The determination of what constitutes a "custodial
interrogation" has been the subject of much litigation, 4 both in
civilian and military courts. As a starting point,55 the Supreme
Court held that a custodial interrogation had occurred when the
defendant, while incarcerated in a state prison, was questioned by
Internal Revenue agents regarding the filing of his tax returns5 6
The same finding was made when a defendant was questioned by
police in his own bedroom at 4 a.m. regarding his being at the
scene of a homocide and his ownership of a pistol later determined
to have been the weapon which fired the fatal shot.57
The Court of Military Appeals has run the gamut of
51. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 403,37 C.M.R. 23 (1966).
52. 16 U.S.C.M.R. 213,36 C.M.R. 369 (1966).
53. 15 U.S.C.M.A. 181, 35 C.M.R. 153 (1964).
54. Comment, 35 TENN. L.R. 604 (1968).
55. "By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 444.
56. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
57. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
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custodial interrogation situations since Tempia. The first
application correctly anticipated the Supreme Court's ruling in
Mathis by finding a custodial interrogation present when the
accused was interrogated while imprisoned."
A second application resulted in a 'finding of no custodial
interrogation when an air policeman, performing evening duties in
the base equipment office, and required to check all persons in the
area, saw the accused receive a tool box from someone inside the
office. The policeman asked the accused if he worked there and
for his identification, receiving in reply a request for a "break"
and an offer of fifty dollars if the policeman would let the accused
go 9 The military version of a "bedside interrogation" resulted in
a strict application of Orozco v. Texas60 and a finding of a
custodial interrogation when only two officers were present in the
accused's home."1 In the military view, a custodial interrogation
necessarily results after the accused has been arrested on suspicion
of his involvement in an activity for which he is later prosecuted.
2
But, absent an arrest, the turning point is whether the interrogator
suspects the accused of criminal activity when the interrogator
speaks to him. In United States v. McCrary,3 the escort taking
the accused to be checked off base following his larceny conviction
was held to have implied knowledge of the accused's conviction
and thus should have warned the accused before asking if there
was anything in his car the accused did not wish found.
In United States v. Corson,6 the Court of Military Appeals
held that warnings should have been given when the accused's
superior suspected him of possessing marijuana cigarettes and
demanded them by saying, "I think that you know what I want,
give it to me."65
58. United States v. McCauley, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 81,37 C.M.R. 345 (1967).
59. United States v. Ballard, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 96, 37 C.M.R. 360 (1967).
60. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
61. United States v. Phifer, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 508,40 C.M.R. 220 (1969).
62. United States v. Wagner, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 216, 39 C.M.R. 216 (1969) (participant
in riot).
63. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 104,39 C.M.R. 104 (1969).
64. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 34, 39 C.M.R. 34 (1968). See United States v. Anglin, 18
U.S.C.M.A. 520, 40 C.M.R. 232 (1969) (interrogator should have considered accused a
suspect).
65. Even prior to Viranda and Tempia, the military had dealt with the same question.
United States v. Ward, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 33 C:M.R. 215 (1963), found no need for an
Article 31 warning by a clerk who asked the accused for a document to complete his pay
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The Court of Military Appeals had occasion to deal with
Miranda's proclamation that "[t]here is no requirement that
police stop a person who enters a police station and states that
he wishes to confess to a crime ... .""6 in United States v.
Vogel.17 The accused, questioned with the rest of his squad without
either warnings or enlightening responses, went to the chapel and
decided to confess; subsequently he went to his superior who took
him to headquarters for the purpose of making a statement. The
court found that Vogel's motivation was to "get it off his chest,"
and it was for that reason that he confessed. Confessions made
to undercover agents pretending to be criminal suspects have yet
to be acted upon by the Supreme Court; however, the military
upheld such a confession in United States v. Hinkson.6" No
custodial interrogation was found to exist when a military
informant agreed to act as a law-breaker to gain Hinkson's
confidence. The informant told the accused of his own purported
involvement and then waited for the accused to volunteer
inculpatory statements. Both Vogel and Hinkson had vigorous
dissenting opinions.
A distinct area, separate from the question of warnings, is the
Miranda requirement that any incriminating statement be found
voluntary before it may be used against the defendant. 9 The
Supreme Court has declared that a confession may be found
involuntary even if warnings were properly given, as witnessed by
Sims v. Georgia.7" The Court has not hestitated to strike down
convictions based upon statements obtained under compromising
circumstances, on the theory that the "totality of the
circumstances" was such as to make the confession involuntary.
Based upon Davis v. North Carolina,7' where the Court held that
lack of warnings coupled with holding the accused
record, which document the accused furnished. The accused was later prosecuted for
receiving extra pay without authorization. The clerk suspected Ward of nothing when the
request was made.
66. 384 U.S. at 478.
67. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 160, 39 C.M.R. 160 (1969).
68. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 126,37 C.M.R. 390 (1967).
69. 384 U.S. at 478.
70. 389 U.S. 404 (1967) (defendant subjected to physical violence prior to his
confession, kept by police for eight hours and not fed or allowed to see anyone; subsequent
warnings prior to his confession did not detract from the involuntary nature of the
confession).
71. 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
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incommunicado for sixteen days until he confessed produced an
involuntary confession, a series of decisions held statements
involuntary under the "totality of the circumstances" doctrine.1
2
The military has consistently held that the voluntariness of a
confession is a question of fact which must be shown by the
government beyond a reasonable doubt.7 3 United States v.
Howard74 held the accused's statement voluntary when two
investigators questioned him alternately, one interrogator asking
questions relentlessly and the other in a friendly manner. Against
the accused's claim that he had desired to remain silent after
talking with both agents for some time, the court found that he
merely had decided not to talk to one interrogator, finding no
psychological pressure had been used to induce him to waive his
right to remain silent. And, in United States v. Barksdale,5 the
court found that the accused answered some questions "no" to
indicate his answer and others with the same word to indicate that
he did not wish to answer. The accused admitted he had the
understanding that he could leave at any time, resulting in a
finding that he was willing to be questioned. On the other hand,
United States v. O'Such,71 decided before Tempia, held
involuntary a confession made after the accused had been
questioned all night, put into solitary confinement without light,
72. Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346 (1968) (held two days; questioned whole
time during days and evenings; attorney had tried numerous times to contact; tried to
hypnotize the accused; two previous invalid confessions); Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390
U.S. 519 (1968) (accused had refused to put oral statements in writing, claiming it was
against his constitutional rights and claiming he was entitled to a lawyer); Brooks v.
Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967) (confined naked in tiny cell without toilet; subsisted for two
weeks on twelve ounces of thin soup and eight ounces of water daily; complete domination
by jailors; confession extracted within minutes after brought from cell); Beecher v.
Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (defendant, already wounded by police, ordered at gunpoint
to speak his guilt or be killed; second confession while in hospital, drugged, in pain and
at mercy of prison hospital authorities); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967) (prolonged
questioning of unintelligent suspect). See also Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219
(1968) (requiring government to show defendant's inculpatory statements at first trial to
have not been induced by government's use of wrongfully obtained confession before
admissible at second trial).
73. United States v. Howard, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 252, 39 C.M.R. 252 (1968); United
States v. Traweek, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 50, 36 C.M.R. 206 (1966).
74. See United States v. Attebury, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 531, 40 C.M.R. 243 (1969) (error
in continued interrogation following accused's assertion of right to remain silent); United
States v. Planter, 18 U.S.M.C.A. 469, 40 C.M.R. 181 (1969) (interrogator admitted
coercive tactics).
75. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 500, 38 C.M.R. 298 (1968).
76. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 537, 37 C.M.R. 157 (1967).
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checked with a flashlight every five minutes, not allowed to lie
down during daytime, given only a plank and pallet upon which
to lie at night, and interrogated the next day and night. 7
Numerous military decisions have dealt with the issue of the
voluntariness of a second statement preceded by proper warnings
following a statement with improper warnings. United States v.
Plau t,78 the most recent of many cases on this point, found no
relationship between two statements made by the accused. The
first statement was made without warnings to a guard who
apprehended the accused and others following the shooting of
another, and the second statement to another guard who
apprehended the accused later without suspecting more than the
unlawful discharge of a firearm. When first interrogated, the
accused had claimed an accidental shooting while the victim tried
to take the gun from him. When apprehended the second time, he
requested that a call be made to his company commander. While
the guard made the call, he volunteered an apology for the
shooting of the victim to the guard. The guard at the time was
unaware of the victim's involvement and had not prompted or
questioned the accused. The test of United States v. Wimberley7l9
would still seem apropos when dealing with a series of statements,
only the last of which was preceded by proper warnings:
Where there are successive statements, it is not a
precondition to the admission of a properly obtained
statement, that the accused be informed that a previous
statement cannot be used against him. . . . But the fact that
77. The test of the voluntariness of a confession is whether accused, at the time it
was made, possessed the mental freedom to speak or remain silent....
The matter in issue is not the tendency of measures taken by the Government
to cause a false statement to be obtained, but whether they are consistent with
constitutional due process.
Id. at 543 and 163. See United States v. Dalrymple, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 307, 34 C.M.R. 87
(1963) (holding a promise of immunity vitiated the warnings given to the accused); United
States v. Askew, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 257, 34 C.M.R. 37 (1963) (holding a "bargain" between
interrogators and the accused not to question the accused's pregnant wife vitiated the
warnings given to the accused); United States v. Shanks, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 586, 31 C.M.R.
172 (1961) (remanding for a rehearing to determine voluntariness of accused's confession
to an agent, with proper warnings preceeding the interview, following a beating of the
accused by fellow servicemen earlier after he had made statements to the victim of the
larceny).
78. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 265, 39 C.M.R. 265 (1969).
79. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 36 C.M.R. 159 (1966) (overruled by Tempia on the issue of
adequacy of warnings).
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an inadmissible statement was previously obtained is a factor
to be considered in determining the voluntariness of the later
statement. . . . Whether the taint of the first statement
influenced the making of the second depends on the
surrounding circumstances."
United States v. Lake"' has anticipated the Supreme Court
in dealing with admissions. While conceding that a confession
must have a showing of voluntariness to be admitted into
evidence, Lake held that an admission does not require the same
showing, absent evidence of involuntariness. The holding would
appear to provide a fair and reasonable approach to the question,
in light of the recent Supreme Court cases dealing with the issue
of voluntariness.
An interesting variation on the issue of voluntariness
occurred in United States v. Goldman.82 During a recess of an
Article 32 Investigation, convened to determine the need for a
court-martial, the accused incriminated himself in the presence of
the investigating officer, who used the statement against the
accused at the later court-martial. The accused's lawyer was at the
time placing a telephone call. Goldman wandered next to the
investigating officer, who was observing activities outside the
room through a window, and initiated a conversation. He
commented on the reason that he had left on an unauthorized
absence. Refusing to apply the rule that no conversations may
take place with an accused after defense counsel has been
appointed,8 3 the Court of Military Appeals instead relied upon
United States v. Schlomann8 ' in holding admissible certain
confessions which occur in the absence of defense counsel.
80. Id. at 9 and 165. See United States v. Workman, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 228, 35 C.M.R.
200 (1965) (held spontaneous accused's statement requesting leave from commanding
officer to get a loan to pay back what he had taken when the statement was made several
days after he had been questioned without proper warnings concerning missing documents
and had admitted his involvement); United States v. Caliendo and Wolf, 13 U.S.M.C.A.
405, 32 C.M.R. 405 (1962) (requiring that a strong showing exist that the taint of a prior
illegal statement be removed before a subsequent one is admissible); United States v.
Powell, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 364, 32 C.M.R. 364 (1962) (holding inadmissible subsequent
statement made when accused aware that authorities know of his involvement and his prior
inadmissible statement and the agent taking it were present at the subsequent
interrogation).
81. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 3,37 C.M.R. 267 (1969).
82. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 389,40 C.M.R. 101 (1969).
83. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (upholding such a rule in New
York).
84. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 414, 37 C.M.R. 34 (1966).
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The military has also refused to allow a victim to be
impeached at trial for his failure to testify during earlier
proceedings at which he was the potential defendant.15 Although
no post-Tempia cases have occurred on the subject, there is no
reason to believe that the military will deviate from its refusal to
allow the prosecution to comment upon the failure of the accused
to testify in his own behalf or upon his reliance upon any of his
constitutional rights.
While the Supreme Court has held that the taking of hand-
writing exemplars is not within the area of self-incrimination, but
instead enjoys the status of an "identifying physical
characteristic" outside the protection of the fifth amendment,
8 7
the military has taken a unique position which affords the accused
considerably more protection. As a result of United States v.
Minnifield,88 military investigators are required to advise the
85. United States v. Johnson, 18 U.S-C.M.A. 241, 39 C.M.R. 241 (1969).
86. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (comment on defendant's failure to
take the stand); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (comment on defendant's failure
to take the stand); United States v. Stegar, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 569, 37 C.M.R. 189 (1967)
(error to cross-examine accused relative to his prior reliance on constitutional rights);
United States v. %lartin, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 531, 37 C.M.R. 151 (1967) (error to admit
evidence of accused's prior reliance upon constitutional rights); United States v. Kavula,
16 U.S.C.M.A. 468, 37 C.M.R. 88 (1966) (error to allow prosecution to rebut defense
evidence of accused's mental incompetency by showing that he had previously declined and
then requested counsel); United States v. Jones, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 22, 36 C.M.R. 178 (1966)
(error to admit evidence that the accused had declined to answer questioning); United
States v. Andrews, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 20, 36 C.M.R. 176 (1966) (error to allow evidence of
accused's refusal to take a blood alcohol test); United States v. Sutton, 15 U.S.C.M.A.
531, 36 C.M.R. 29 (1965) (error in instruction by judge that the accused might remain
silent at the peril of admitting the government's case); United States v. Russell, 15
U.S.C.M.A. 76, 35 C.M.R. 48 (1964) (error in prosecutor's comment on the accused's
refusal to take a blood test in trial for carnal knowledge); United States v. Gordon, 14
U.S.C.M.A. 314, 34 C.M.R. 94 (1963) (error in commenting directly on accused's silence).
Of the cases cited, only Andrews was found to be non-prejudicial error, and then only
because so much other evidence of the accused's guilt of negligent homocide existed. It
will be interesting to examine the treatment given by the military to any further cases on
this point, in light of the Supreme Court's limitations on the "harmless error" rule
contained in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), modifying Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), which required a finding of harmlessness beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of
Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L. REv. 519 (1968). See also Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S.
731 (1969), a post-Bruton decision holding that proper instructions cured the prosecutor's
opening statement referring to a co-defendant's confession when the co-defendant later
refused to testify, and Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), allowing the use of
a co-defendant's confession with limiting instructions.
87. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
88. 9 U.S.C.M.A. 373, 26 C.M.R. 153 (1958).
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accused in accordance with Article 31 before asking for a
handwriting exemplar. The military considers such samples as the
equivalent of a "statement" for the purposes of Article 31.11 A
reasonable extension of the rule requires civilian investigators to
advise military defendants in accordance with Article 31 only
when they act on behalf of the military."
C. Protection Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
The fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures has been the topic for a considerable number
of recent decisions by the Supreme Court. The decisions have
encompassed, among other areas, the issues of probable cause,
standing to object, "stop and frisk" searches, searches incident to
arrest, consent searches and questions regarding whether a search
actually occurred.
Spinelli v. United States" provided perhaps the most
controversial decision in the area of probable cause for some time.
Probable cause was found lacking in an FBI agent's allegation
that a confidential reliable informer had supplied information that
a wagering suspect was conducting gambling operations by means
of two telephones, whose numbers the informer specified. The
corroboration supplied consisted merely of evidence that the
suspect went in and out of the apartment where the telephone
numbers were listed. The Court found that Spinelli did not
sufficiently establish compliance with the twofold test to
determine the presence of probable cause supplied by Aguilar v.
89. United States v. Lewis, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 355, 40 C.M.R. 67 (1969); United States
v. White, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 211, 38 C.M.R. 9 (1967).
90. United States v. Holcomb, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 202, 39 C.M.R. 202 (1969) (allowing
exemplar taken following insufficient Article 31 warnings by Secret Service agent not
acting on behalf of military); United States v. Penn, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 194, 198-99, 39
C.M.R. 194, 198-99 (1969).
[M]ilitary investigators, acting indepedently in what can be described as an
exclusive military investigation, must provide the threshold advice required by
Article 31 before asking the accused for a sample of his handwriting, but
civilian investigators, acting entirely independent of military authority, need
not, as persons not subject to the Code, preliminarily advise an accused of his
rights under Article 31.
Civilian investigators must warn in accordance with Article 31 when (1) "the scope and
character of the co-operative efforts demonstrate 'that the two investigations merged into
an indivisible entity,'" . . . and (2) "when the civilian investigator acts 'in furtherance
of any military investigation, or in any sense as an instrument of the military'.
91. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
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Texas.9" Aguilar required that (1) the application for a warrant to
search set forth necessary "underlying circumstances" to enable
the magistrate to independently judge the validity of the
informant's conclusion; and (2) the affiant-officers attempt to
support their claim that the informant was "credible" or his
information "reliable." Sibron v. New York and Peters v. New
York,9 3 companion cases to Spinelli, provided an interesting
comparison of probable cause. Sibron refused to accept a
warrantless search as a self-protective search for weapons by the
arresting officer on the grounds that no probable cause existed for
the arrest. The suspect's mere acts of speaking with a number of
known narcotics addicts over an eight-hour period of observation
were considered inadequate to support an arrest for any crime
whatsoever. However, Peters found evidence that the arresting
officer heard noises outside the door of the apartment he had
rented for twelve years, opened it and saw two unknown men tip-
toeing down the hall, both of whom ran when they saw the officer.
This evidence was more than sufficient to establish probable cause
to arrest the accused and validate the subsequent cursory search
resulting in the discovery of burglary tools. It would appear that
the Supreme Court is demanding rigid adherence to the Aguilar
test, particularly in regard to the "underlying circumstances"
requirement. 4
The Court of Military Appeals has recently decided a great
many cases on the issue of probable cause. The most recent
decision, United States v. Goldman, 5 found probable cause
92. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
93. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
94. See McCray v. Illinois, 396 U.S. 300 (1967) (found probable cause when
informant reported defendant selling narcotics, possessed narcotics, and could be found at
a particular intersection; police arrived and observed him engaging in suspicious acts);
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1967) (found probable cause when agents
observed repeated deliveries of loads of sugar in sixty pound bags, smelled the odor of
fermenting mash, and heard sounds similar to a motor or pump coming from defendant's
house); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964)1(establishing exclusionary rule); Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (found probable cause when informer described exact clothing
defendant would wear when arriving; agents corroborated clothing worn upon arrival). See
also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (no probable cause for police, over ten day
period, to question, fingerprint and then release at least twenty-four Negro youths in rape
investigation; decided upon an unfortunate set of circumstances resulting in unnecessary
intrusions into defendant's personal security).
95. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 389, 40 C.M.R. 101 (1969). See Larkin, Search AuthOrized by a
Commanding Officer: The Requirement of Probable Cause, 21 JAG J. 3 (1966); Hamel,
Military Search and Seizure-Probable Cause Requirement, 39 MIL. L. REV. 41 (1968).
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present for a search when an unauthorized absentee, who was
picked up by investigators, related that he had met the accused
through other associates and that the accused had told him of his
activities in passing counterfeit money. The informant referred to
another person, who was taken into custody. The second person
portrayed himself as one engaged in counterfeiting and a criminal
associate of the accused. He reported that the counterfeit money
could be found in the building where he and the accused rented
rooms. United States v. Price" found no probable cause to believe
currency was concealed at the location to be searched when
neither the inspector's testimony nor the authorizing papers
delineated the facts upon which the belief was based. United
States v. Soto97 also declined to find probable cause when the
searching officer had been informed that a wallet with a sum of
money in it had been taken from under the owner's pillow, and
that the accused had been seen during the approximate time of the
loss in another row of tents some twenty feet from the victim's
tent bending over a bunk as though he were feeling under it.
United States v. Thomas" not only found no probable cause, but
not even suspicion, when the accused's superior took from him a
bottle, later found to contain heroin, for the sole reason that he
found the accused asleep with the bottle in his hand. Other
decisions of the Court of Military Appeals clearly indicate a
deepfy entrenched understanding of the distinctions between
suspicion and probable cause. 9 The military has also indicated its
96. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 566,38 C.M.R. 364 (1968).
97. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 583,37 C.M.R. 203 (1967).
98. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 306, 36 C.M.R. 462 (1966).
99. See United States v. Carter, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 277, 36 C.M.R. 433 (1966) (found
probable cause in request mentioning the dwelling to be searched and accompanying
affidavits specifying clearly the property in question); United States v. Penman, 16 U.S.
C.M.A. 67, 36 C.M.R. 223 (1966) (no probable cause in search of accused when only
evidence showed state narcotics agents raided location, shortly after accused left, and found
narcotics; persons arrested at location indicated accused used or possessed marijuana; no
indication of reliability of the unknown sources of information); United States v. Martinez,
16 U.S.C.M.A. 40, 36 C.M.R. 196 (1966) (found probable cause when victim awoke to
discover accused going through his cloths; three other such cases with the same modus
operandi had taken place in the same area within a period of less than a month); United
States v. Dollison, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 595, 36, C.M.R. 93 (1966), (no probable cause when
sole information was that items other than those for which accused was already charged
discovered missing from the office where he had worked); United States v. Hartsook, 15
U.S.C.M.A. 291, 35 C.M.R. 263 (1965) (no probable cause in request to search when
failed to mention specific things to be seized, but description only of the methods it was
suspected that the accused used in altering bingo cards); United States v. Davenport, 14
U.S.C.M.A. 152, 33 C.M.R. 364 (1963) (no probable cause in request describing property
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understanding that the facts upon which the search is authorized
must be closely related to the time of the issuance of the search
authorization.100
Standing to raise the objection to an unreasonable search or
seizure has historically stemmed from the presence of a "property
right" of the objecting party in the property seized or his
legitimate presence on the premises searched.'0' Spinelli v. United
States'02 extended this reasoning to include the situation where the
defendant was arrested outside his apartment by agents who
waited for him to leave, arrested him, obtained the key to his
apartment and searched the apartment. However, Mancusi v.
DeForte°s found standing to object by a union official when union
documents had been seized from his office, which was shared with
others, on the theory that the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of freedom from government intrusion of his office.'" 4
But the presence of a property right of the defendant in the
property searched does not allow him to successfully object to the
fruits of a search of property jointly possessed with another when
the other party consents to a search of the jointly possessed
property."5
to be seized, but without source of information or any corroboration; found to be illegal
"shakedown" search upon an unreliable tip); United States v. Battista, 14 U.S.C.M.A.
70, 33 C.M.R. 282 (1963) (no probable cause for search based on allegation of two sailors
that accused suggested and/or forced homosexual conduct while they were under influence
of drugs in dental office); United States v. Ness, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 18, 32 C.M.R. 18 (1962)
(found probable cause in description by informant of accused and two others and their
discussion concerning the sale of government property, including time and place of sale
and license number of accused's car; corroboration included following of car by agents
and observation of described black market operators following pre-described route at times
and places that informant had provided).
100. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.
364 (1964); United States v. Britt, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 617, 38 C.M.R. 415 (1968) (insufficient
relation of facts to authorization when the accused was observed smoking marijuana five
months before the search of his locker); United States v. Lange, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 486, 35
C.M.R. 458 (1965) (search conducted seventeen days after authorization for inspection and
immediately following report of theft; searching officer conceded he intended to look for
stolen property).
101. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (standing found when defendant
arrested in his apartment). See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
102. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
103. 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
104. Extension of protection against unreasonable searches.and seizures to
commercial premises such as offices is not a noveJ concept. See See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541 (1967); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427 (1963); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 244 (1931);
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
105. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (seizure of duffel bag used by defendant
and another upheld when joint user consented to search).
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The dual concepts embraced in Jones v. United States'"' have
not only been adopted by the military, but have been extended to
forbid the accused standing to suppress the fruits of a search of
his roommate's locker, resulting in the discovery of the accused's
marijuana, where clear evidence displayed that the accused had
neither express nor implied permission to store the marijuana in
his roommate's locker.107 Recognition of the "jointly possessed"
issue has also been afforded by the military in United States v.
Mathis,10 8 where officers entered the accused's house at the
invitation of another resident. The Court of Military Appeals held
that the other resident could consent to a search of the house
insofar as any jointly possessed portions were concerned, but
could not consent to a search of the personal belongings of the
accused, such as his bedroom dresser.
The area of warrantless searches incident to arrest has been
the subject of considerable consternation to the Supreme Court,
both separate from and in connection with "stop and frisk"
situations. Most dramatic among the recent decisions was Chimel
v. California,'0' condemning a warrantless search of the
defendant's entire house, incident to a proper arrest in the house
for burglary. The search extended beyond the defendant's person
and the area from which he might have obtained either a weapon
or something that could have been used as evidence against him.
Chimel followed the reasoning of Terry v. Ohio,"' decided the
previous term, to the effect that "the police must, whenever
practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and
seizures through the warrant procedure . . ."I" and that "[t]he
scope of the search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible."1 2 Terry,
which upheld the "stop and frisk" search by an officer who
observed conduct by the defendant and another consistent with the
theory that they were "casing" a building in anticipation of a
robbery, allowed the officer to make a preliminary search of the
suspects for weapons by "patting down" their outer garments.,"
106. See note 101 supra.
107. United States v. Aloyian, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 333, 36 C.M.R. 489 (1966).
108. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 522, 37 C.M.R. 142 (1967).
109. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
110. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
111. Id. at 20.
112. Id. at 19.
113. But see Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), holding invalid a search where
the policeman reached into the suspect's pocket to find narcotics, not motivated by
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Warden v. Hayden"4 had been the forerunner of the two decisions.
It sustained the right of police in hot pursuit of a robber to
conduct a warrantless search of the house into which he fled and
later use as evidence against him clothes found in the washing
machine in the basement, identified as the clothes he wore during
the robbery, and a pistol and shotgun found in the bathroom
adjoining the bedroom where the defendant was arrested. The
Supreme Court discarded the distinction between "mere
evidence," which could not be seized by warrant or otherwise, and
those objects which may validly be seized, including
instrumentalities and means by which the crime is committed, the
fruits, weapons by which escape might be effected and property
the possession of which is a crime. Chimel expressly overruled
United States v. Rabinowitz,"5 holding that the validity of a
warrantless search is based upon the reasonableness of the search,
rather than whether it was reasonable to procure a warrant."6
Military cases in the vein of Chimel, Terry and Hayden have
not presented themselves to the Court of Military Appeals
recently. However, the military has anticipated the Supreme
Court in holding that, although probable cause for a search was
present, unauthorized search of private property will not be upheld
absent circumstances showing that it was incident to an arrest or
that authorities were confronted with the grave possibilities of the
protection. See LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters
and Beyond, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 40 (1968); Comment, 53 MINN. L. REv. 652 (1969);
Comment, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 485 (1969); Note, 78 YALE L.J. 433 (1969).
114. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
115. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
116. For a history of the development of the rule, see also Ker v. California, 274 U.S.
23 (1963) (applying Rabinowitz); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (regarding
"reasonableness"); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (applying Rabinowitz);
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) (unexplained failure of agents to procure
warrant invalidated search when great deal of time available); Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145 (1947) (sustaining search for papers incident to arrest); United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) (requiring a warrant if practicable; Go-Bart Importing Co.
v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) (requiring a warrant if practicable); Marron v.
United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (upholding warrantless search for means of committing
crime); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (allowing warrantless search
incident to arrest of "the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things
connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well
as weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody"); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925) (allowing search of place within suspect's control when arrested);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (approving warrantless search incident to
arrest).
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destruction or removal of the objects of the search." 7 Decker
disallowed the fruits of a search, conducted without authorization
after the accused's arrest, on the basis that the "place and time
of an arrest must be intimately connected with the place and time
of the search to justify the latter as an incident of the former.""'
Probable cause for a search incident to an arrest was found when
the accused in United States v. Herberg"9 was reported operating
a vehicle unsafely, in connection with another similar complaint
describing the accused's vehicle. But the search of the vehicle was
made after the accused had been apprehended and taken to
headquarters, rendering the subsequently discovered gun to be
inadmissible in evidence against the accused.
20
"Consent searches" have been clearly defined and strictly
construed by the Supreme Court, especially when dealing with
circumstances which might vitiate the consent originally given.' 2,
Bumper v. North Carolinat'2 declared illegal a search by agents
who falsely told the occupant of the house that they had a search
warrant. Although the occupant then acquiesced to their search,
her acquiescence did not constitute consent.
The military adopted the same theory in United States v.
Westmore. 23 Westmore refused to allow acquiescence and
ratification as a substitute for consent in a search where the
accused was in custody and was asked by an investigator to point
out his barracks and locker. The investigator told the accused that
he wished to search the locker, and the accused then pointed out
the locker. United States v. Johnson'24 used the same reasoning
in upholding a search of the accused's locker on the theory of
''consent." The accused testified that he had understood the
117. United States v. Decker, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 397, 37 C.M.R. 17 (1966).
118. Id. at 401, 37 C.M.R. at 21. See United States v. Garlich, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 362,
35 C.M.R. 334 (1965).
119. 15 U.S.C.M.A. 247, 35 C.M.R. 219 (1965).
120. United States v. Simpson, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 18, 34 C.M.R. 464 (1964), upheld,
as incident to a proper arrest, a search of the accused. The search disclosed worthless
checks which constituted the instrumentalities of the crime. United States v. Ross, 13
U.S.C.M.A. 432, 32 C.M.R. 432 (1963), upheld as incident to an arrest a search of the
accused's bedroom, kitchen and dining room for fruits of the crime. The agents, posing
as buyers of Navy examinations the accused was suspected of selling, had been sold one
copy by the accused.
121. See Mintz, Search of Premises by Consent, 73 Dick. L. Rev. 44 (1968).
122. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
123. 14 U.S.C.M.A. 474,34 C.M.R. 254 (1964).
124. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 514, 38 C.M.R. 312 (1968).
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request to search to be "imploratory" rather than "mandatory'
and had twice previously ignored the request."5
In both civilian and military situations, the question of
whether the acts of law enforcement officials constitute a search
has caused concern on several occasions. Harris v. United
States26 determined that no search had been made when a robbery
victim's auto registration card was found by an officer while
removing valuables from the defendant's impounded vehicle, when
the card was plainly visible to the officer.127 The seizure was
upheld upon the theory that the acts by the officer were protective
measures for the safety of the vehicle.
12
1
United States v. McCrary,12 9 however, found a search when
the accused's military escort, upon orders from his superior,
opened the accused's car for the purpose of retrieving an item
which the accused had indicated was there and did not belong to
him. The escort saw other government owned items in the car. He
collected and turned in everything which appeared to belong to the
government. Since the search was without authorization and
probable cause, the Court of Military Appeals found it illegal.
But, when Air Force regulations required an inventory of an
accused's belongings when he was confined, no search was
found. 130 Military authorities inventoried the accused's belongings,
and found stolen checks and packages. The accused had been
confined on suspicion of breaking into a post office and
ransacking a mailbag.
Understandably, the military has not had occasion to become
involved in the area of "electronic eavesdropping" to any great
extent. United States v. Wright' provided an indication of how
the military would react to this intricate area of the law. The
Court of Military Appeals upheld the secret use of a recording
device by one party to a telephone conversation, unknown to the
other party, as a permissible means of recording accurately the
125. See United States v. Rushing, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 298, 38 C.M.R. 96 (1967).
126. 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
127. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
128. Cf Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (upholding search of auto in police
possession under state statute requiring seizure and forfeiture of automobiles when
transporting narcotics).
129. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 104, 39 C.M.R. 104 (1969).
130. United States v. Kazmierczak, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 594, 37 C.M.R. 214 (1967).
131. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967).
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content of the conversation. In Wright, the accused had been
suspected of placing obscene telephone calls. He consented, after
proper warnings as to self-incrimination and counsel, to speak
with one victim for the purpose of voice identification. The court
upheld the right of the investigating officer to explain to the victim
that a "suspect" would be speaking to her and to require the
suspect to change voice inflection. It also upheld the right of the
government to record the conversation unbeknown to the accused.
In light of the advice given to the accused and the circumstances
of the "eavesdropping," the case would hardly fall within the
ambit of protection afforded by Katz v. United States,"' which
held that a search or seizure of speech does not require a trespass
or actual penetration of a particular enclosure.
D. Right to a Speedy Trial
One of the relatively few areas in which the Supreme Court
has not been extremely active during recent years is that of speedy
trial. Surprisingly few factual situations have confronted the
Court upon this point, especially in light of the Court's earlier
proclamations:
The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is
consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It
secures rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the rights
of public justice. . .. 33 and [w]hether delay in completing a
prosecution. . . amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of
rights depends upon the circumstances. . . . The delay must
not be purposeful or oppressive. .... 4
Unusual factual situations have been presented to the Court
in recent years. In Smith v. Hooey,'3 it was determined that the
sixth amendment's provision affording an accused a right to a
speedy trial was applicable to a federal prisoner who had
requested trial on a state charge. The state failed to act for six
years. The Court reasoned that defense difficulties created by such
a long delay are apt to be markedly increased when the accused
is confined in another jurisdiction. The state must honor a
132. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz was decided approximately four months after Wright.
133. Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905).
134. Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957). "The essential ingredient is
orderly expedition and not mere speed." Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10 (1959).
135. 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
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demand for a speedy trial by attempting to obtain the accused's
release or suffer the consequences of being barred from
prosecuting him. Klopfer v. North Carolina136 found a violation
of the right to speedy trial when the government entered "nolle
prosequi with leave," thus allowing the defendant his liberty. But,
it did-not relieve him of the limitations placed upon him by
prosecution. The government's action would have had the effect
of vesting discretion in the solicitor to hold the defendant subject
to trial, over his objection, throughout an unlimited period of time
during which the solicitor could restore the case to the calendar.
However, during this time there was no means by which the
defendant could obtain dismissal or have the case restored to the
calendar for trial. Although the defendant would be under no
restraint of any kind and the statute of limitations upon the
charges would be tolled, he could still be tried. United States v.
Ewell' 7 found no infringement upon the defendants' rights to a
speedy trial when they were promptly indicted and convicted after
their original arrests and were immediately arrested and rei-
indicted in due course after their motions to vacate sentence had
been granted. The decision was made notwithstanding a 19 month
delay between the original arrest and the hearings upon the
subsequent indictments.
The military's adaptation of the sixth amendment's
guarantee of a speedy trial is premised upon two statutory
prerequisites. Before a speedy trial motion will lie, the accused
must show that he has either been charged formally with the crime
in question or placed in some form of restraint.13 8 Any delay in
preferring charges, absent restraint, is pertinent only in
determining time limitations as required by the particular statute
of limitations upon the offense. The military has been faced with
numerous allegations of denial of the right to speedy trial.'39 These
cases strictly interpret the guarantee in favor of the accused. The
military, perhaps in keeping with its reputation for accomplishing
objectives with a minimum loss of time, interprets the guarantee
in terms of months rather than in years.
The breakthrough in the military accused's favor appears to
136. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
137. 383 U.S. 116 (1966).
138. 10 U.S.C. § 810 (1956).
139. Ross, Avoiding the Speedy Trial Issue, 21 JAG J. 101 (1967).
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have taken place in United States v. Parrish.14 0 The accused was
charged with attempted robbery and attempted murder, alleged to
have occurred on August 23, 1966. He was brought to trial on
January 4, 1967.
Parrish was confined the day of the offenses. His statement
was taken two days later. The inverviews of witnesses were
completed by the investigators in mid-September. The
investigatory report was dated October 3. Charges were read to
the accused on October 12 and additional charges were read 13
days later. The Article 32 pre-trial investigation, the military
substitute for a grand jury proceeding, was held November 2 and
its report completed 16 days later. Charges were referred
December 8 and the accused served December 12, with trial
immediately following the Christmas holidays. The four and one-
half month delay was held to have denied the accused his right to
a speedy trial.
Parrish provided the impetus for a new era regarding the
right to a speedy trial in military law, as evidenced by United
States v. Smith. 4' Smith, charged with marijuana offenses alleged
to have occurred on November 30, 1966, was eventually tried on
April 18, 1967. He had been restricted to the base during the
interim. Holding that the restriction of the accused amounted to
'restraint-in-fact," the Court of Military Appeals determined
that the government had not acted with "reasonable dispatch" in
proceeding to trial with the accused. United States v.
Weisenmulle 42 continued the trend. The accused, charged with
marijuana offenses alleged to have occurred prior to March 8,
1967, was kept in "strict punitive type restriction" from that date
until August 11. His trial was held on September 7, 1967. The
Court of Military Appeals held he was- denied his right to a speedy
trial. The crux of the decision lay in an unexplained 72 day delay
between the date he was originally picked up and the date charges
were brought against him.1
3
140. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 411,38 C.M.R. 209 (1968).
141. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 427, 38 C.M.R. 225 (1968).
142. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 636, 38 C.M.R. 434 (1968).
143. See United States v. Keaton, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 500, 38 C.M.R. 212 (1969) (delay
in obtaining custody of accused held prejudicial); United States v. Hawes, 18 U.S.C.M.A.
464, 40 C.M.R. 176 (1969) (106 day interval between confinement and trial for
unauthorized absence held non-prejudicial); United States v. Williams, 16 U.S.C.M.A.
589, 37 C.M.R. 209 (1967) (denial of right to speedy trial when 318 days between initial
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The military has not hesitated to allow the reviewing courts
to inquire into the reasons for delays in bringing an accused to
trial. United States v. White44 found error in the refusal of the
reviewing court to allow appellate defense counsel's request to
inquire into the reasons for an unexplained delay of five months
in bringing the accused to trial. The record showed that the
accused had been restricted to his barracks for five months
without explanation other than that he had submitted to a
psychiatric examination during that period of time. United States
v. Smith4' upheld an inquiry by the judge of the accused as to
whether the defense had been prejudiced in any way by the delay
in bringing the case to trial. Holding that the defense was not
required to submit any proof, the Court of Military Appeals
found that the burden to show that the delay was reasonable was
properly placed upon the prosecution.'48 Furthermore, the military
has condemned any pre-trial agreements which purport to waive
the accused's rights to speedy trial or due process in exchange for
a guaranteed ceiling for the sentence.
4 7
E. Right to a Fair Trial
Military courts are not composed of jurors in the sense that
civilian juries are so constituted, but rather are composed of
members of the armed forces, usually officers. The military has
taken many steps to insure the impartiality of the members of the
arrest and trial, although a simple case of false claims by the accused with a full confession
2 days after his arrest); United States v. Tibbs, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 350, 353, 35 C.M.R. 322,
325 (1965) (holding a 55 day delay between charges for attempted larceny and
housebreaking and trial as non-prejudicial; "It suffices to note that the touchstone for
measurement of compliance with the provisions of the Uniform Code is not constant
motion, but reasonable diligence in bringing the charges to trial."); United States v.
Brown, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 11, 32 C.M.R. 11 (1962) (no unreasonable delay in trying the
accused in January for offenses to which he confessed the previous July where most of the
time was spent correcting deficiencies in the investigation to protect the rights of the
accused; difficulties in proceeding to trial; some delays attributable to the defense). See also
Torvestad, Speedj, Trial in Military Law, 8 U.S.A.F. JAG L. REv. 33 (No. 3, 1966)
(review of law prior to Parrish).
144. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 462, 38 C.M.R. 260 (1968).
145. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 55, 37 C.M.R. 319 (1967).
146. Compare United States v. Lamphere, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 580, 37 C.M.R. 200
(1967), where the Court of Military Appeals refused to disturb an appellate dismissal of
all charges after the reviewing court independently screened, weighed, and evaluated the
facts and the record displayed a substantial basis for the action in the accused's favor.
147. United States v. Pratt, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 464, 39 C.M.R. 262 (1968); United
States v. Cummings, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 376, 38 C.M.R. 174 (1968).
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court and the judge, the absence of command influence upon the
court and judge, and the adequacy of counsel. In addition, the
armed forces have equalled, and at times surpassed, the civilian
requirements when dealing with the right to confrontation of
witnesses, the examination of the providence of guilty pleas, the
adequacy of measures to insure the utlimate fairness of trials and
the preservation of due process in prosecuting. and punishing
offenders, and protection against double jeopardy.
The Supreme Court has been adamant in its requirement that
jurors be impartial, especially when dealing with situations
wherein the death sentence is a possibility. Witherspoon v.
Illinois14 refused to allow a defendant to be put to death by a jury
chosen through the exclusion for cause of veniremen who voiced
general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious
or religious objections to the infliction of the death penalty. 4
While the military has not yet acted upon a decision in the
Witherspoon context, dealing with the death penalty, it has dealt
with the issue of voir dire of court members. United States v.
Sutton,50 acting upon the theory that the accused is guaranteed
the right to fair-minded and impartial arbiters of the evidence,
allowed questioning of the military panel regarding their
willingness to convict although entertaining a reasonable doubt as
to the accused's guilt. United States v. Fort' agreed that voir dire
questioning of the panel should extend to inquiry into fixed
preconceptions or inelastic attitudes on the part of the court
members. Such attitudes might support a challenge for cause, even
if the attitude existed only in regard to sentencing.'
The military has long followed the practice of constituting
courts-martial solely of officers unless the accused expressly
requests the presence of enlisted members. Should the accused so
request, the convening authority is obligated to appoint enough
148. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
149. See Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 (1969) (in which the Supreme Court
remanded where an Alabama statute provided that fixed opinion against capital
punishment is good cause for challenge by the state and it appeared that no less than fifteen
jurors were excluded by the prosecution under the terms of the statute); Comment, 21
BAYLOR L. REV. 73 (1969); Note, 53 MINN. L. REV. 838 (1969).
150. 15 U.S.C.M.A. 531, 36 C.M.R. 29 (1965).
151. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 86, 36 C.M.R. 242 (1966).
152. See Holdaway, Voir Dire-A Neglected Toot of Advocacy, 40 MIL. L. REV. I
(1968); Vertuno, Court-Martial Members as Jurors -The Requirement for Impartiality,
20 JAG J. 115 (1966).
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enlisted members to a Special or General Court-Maitial so that
the final membership is at least one-third enlisted, but is not
limited in the maximum number of enlisted members he may
appoint.1 5 3 United States v. Crawford upheld the use of a
selection process for court members where there was no systematic
exclusion of lower enlisted men, but a selection of those who
would best be qualified to judge and sentence an accused. The
process resulted in the use of senior non-commissioned officers.
Of prime importance in recent years has been the Court of
Military Appeals' fight to eliminate command influence upon the
members of military courts. 155 United States v. McLaughlin
56
found command influence when the convening authority set up a
Special Court-Martial consisting of a president and twelve other
members. Then, by memo, the convening authority set up a
schedule of court sessions with only three members to be present
at each session, all the others being excused. On the theory that
appointed members of the court may be excused only through
153. 10 U.S.C. § 825 (c) (1968) amending 10 U.S.C. § 825 (1964). A Special
Court-Martial consists of a minimum of three members on the court, a Military Judge if
the authorized sentence is to include a Bad Conduct Discharge, or trial before the Military
Judge alone if the accused so requests. When the Military Judge presides in the presence
of court members, he does not vote upon either the findings or the sentence, but acts solely
in the capacity of his civilian counterpart. The maximum punitive jurisdiction of a Special
Court-Martial is six months confinement at hard labor, six months forfeiture of two-thirds
base pay per month, reduction to the lowest enlisted pay grade, and a Bad Conduct
Discharge, the latter authorized only when the Military Judge presides and the accused is
represented by lawyer counsel. A General Court-Martial consists of a minimum of five
members on the court, always requires a Military Judge, and may consist of the Military
Judge alone if the accused so requests. Its punitive jurisdiction is limited only by the
maximum punishment for the crime or crimes for which the accused stands convicted, but
may, depending upon the crime in question, authorize death, life imprisonment and total
forfeitures of pay, as well as a Dishonorable Discharge. 10 U.S.C. §§ 816-19 (1968),
amending 10 U.S.C. §§ 816-19 (1964). Lawyer counsel on both sides are mandatory in
General Courts-Martial and lawyer counsel in Special Courts-Martial is almost always
available for the accused, usually without the need for his request, the only exception being
due to "physical conditions or military exigencies." The definite trend is to discontinue
the use of non-lawyer counsel for the accused in Special Courts-Martial, although the
prosecutor may be a non-lawyer. In no event may the prosecutor possess greater
qualifications than the defense counsel. 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1968), amending 10
U.S.C. § 827 (1964). United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963),
upheld the right of the military to use such non-lawyer counsel, but frowned upon the
continuance of such a practice.
154. 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3 (1964), cert. den. 380 U.S. 970 (1965).
155. See Note, 18 CATH. U.L. REV. 429 (1969); Johnson, Unlawful Command
Influence:A Question of Balance, 19 JAG J. 87 (1965).
156. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 61, 39 C.M.R. 61 (1968).
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legitimate excuse, the Court of Military Appeals held that a pre-
arranged absence deprived the president of his right to attend,
preside at and control all sessions but the first. 57 United States
v. Cole5 " found command influence present in the posting of
bulletins by the convening authority indicating that the accused
was to be tried for larceny and indicated that the convening
authority desired to punish the. accused. Post-trial statements of
two members who had read the notices, declaring that they were
not influenced, were not sufficient to dispel all doubt. On the other
hand, United States v. Albert'59 did not find command influence
in lectures by the Staff Judge Advocate to post officers, some of
whom were later members of the accused's court, which called for
careful consideration of the factors that affect a particular
accused. His lecture was not a direction to include certain types
of punishment at all times and under all circumstances, but
reminded listeners that the determination of a sentence was for the
court alone. He discussed administration, morale, and disciplinary
problems resulting from certain types of punishments without
expressing any command desires.'
Attempts have been made to further insure the independence
of military judges, all of whom are lawyers and usually of
relatively high rank in the armed forces, by not allowing the
various convening authorities to evaluate their performance, but
instead placing them in a separate staff corps, answerable only to
the Judge Advocate General of the particular armed force.'6'
The Court of Military Appeals has readily reversed cases
where the convening authority attempted to interfere with the
performance of counsel' 2 or when improper practices of counsel
157. See United States v. Allen, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 626, 18 C.M.R. 250 (1955).
158. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 296, 38 C.M.R. 94 (1967).
159. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 111, 36 C.M.R. 267 (1966).
160. See also United States v. Dubay, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 147, 37 C.M.R. 411 (1967)
(setting up a procedure to deal with command influence); United States v. Johnson, 14
U.S.C.M.A. 548, 34 C.M.R. 328 (1964) (allowing pre-trial orientation of prospective
members but not lectures or pamphlets discussing matters not of concern to members).
161. 10 U.S.C. 826 (1964). See Perkins, The Military Judge: Evolution of a Judiciary,
23 JAG J. 155 (1969); Goldschlager, The 41ilitary Judge, A New Judicial Capacity, I I
JAG L.R. 175 (1969).
162. United States v. Tavolilla, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 395, 38 C.M.R. 193 (1968) (allowing
the judge to consult with the accused in an out-of-court hearing regarding whether he
wishes to excuse two assistant defense counsels, neither of whom had assisted in the
preparation of trial, but refusing to allow the convening authority to authorize the absence
of assistant defense counsel or allocate functions among them).
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or inadequate representation by defense counsel occurred. United
States v. Wood sO condemned defense counsel's failure to object to
the prosecutor's erroneous argument, but did not find reversible
error. United States v. Cook'64 found reversible error in defense
counsel's argument on the sentence which was tantamount to a
concession that a punitive discharge was appropriate, after the
accused had expressed regret for his offenses.' United States v.
Colarusso66 reversed when accused's non-lawyer defense counsel
allowed the accused to take the stand and judicially admit
possession of a firearm present in the court which had previously
been excluded from evidence as being the product of an unlawful
search." 7 The same condemnation has resulted when the defense
163. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 159, 39 C.M.R. 159 (1969).
164. Compare United States v. Garcia, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 75, 39 C.M.R. 75 (1968)
(error in defense counsel's concession of appropriateness of Bad Conduct Discharge).
165. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 94,39 C.M.R. 94 (1969).
166. See United States v. Madeen, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 374, 40 C.M.R. 86 (1969) (no
prejudice in prosecution argument referring to accused's prior conviction when defense
counsel brought it out on cross-examination); United States v. Boberg, 17 U.S.C.M.A.
401, 38 C.M.R. 199 (1968) (reversed upon finding of undue emphasis on military-civilian
relations in prosecution argument); United States v. Pendergrass, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 391, 38
C.M.R. 189 (1968) (error in prosecution argument regarding accused's motivation
unsupported by the evidence); United States v. WVilliams, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 358, 38 C.M.R.
156 (1967) (no error in prosecution comment upon inference to be gained from evidence);
United States v. Long, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 323, 38 C.M.R. 121 (1967) (no error in light of
instructions giving following defense objection to government argument); United States v.
Blunk, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 158, 37 C.M.R. 422 (1967) (was not error for defense counsel to
state that it was against his advice that accused did not want to offer any statement in
mitigation or extenuation); United States v. Mella, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 122, 37 C.M.R. 386
(1967) (error by defense counsel in conceding appropriatness of fine in argument); United
States v. Gerlach, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 383, 37 C.M.R. 3 (1966) (error in that prosecution's
argument inconsistent with stipulations of fact); United States v. Hampton, 16
U.S.C.M.A. 304, 36 C.M.R. 460 (1966) (error in defense counsel's conceding government
a successful prosecution); United States v. Mitchell, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 302, 36 C.M.R. 458
(1966) (error by defense in arguing against accused's interests); United States v.
Wimberley, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 36 C.M.R. 159 (1966) (no error in defense counsel not
raising insanity issue when no support present; error in not arguing against maximum
penalty); United States v. Broy, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 419, 34 C.M.R. 199 (1964) (defense
counsel's duty continues through sentencing; error not to present matters in extenuation
and mitigation although a pre-trial agreement was obtained). See also Chadwick, The
Canons, The Code, and Counsel: The Ethics of Advocates Before Courts-Martial, 38 MIL.
L. REV. 1 (1967).
167. United States v. Donohew, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 149, 39 C.M.R. 14, (1969) (requiring
express questioning of accused regarding absence of defense members; counsel's statement
not enough); United States v. Nichelson, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 69, 39 C.M.R. 69 (1968) (no
error in proceeding without members of the defense when accused indicated he wished to
proceed with his "appointed defense counsel," reasonably implying consent to absence of
assistant).
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did not adequately explain the absence of appointed members of
the defense. 6'
It is basic to the American system of justice that the
defendant be confronted with the witnesses against him and be
afforded ample opportunity to cross-examine them. Although
Harrington v. California6 ' allowed the government to present co-
defendants' confessions without having them present on the theory
that there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, and
proper limiting instructions relegated the error to the status of
"harmless,' 70 Barber v. Page7' was not nearly as permissive.
Barber held that the defendant was denied his right to confront
witnesses against him when the government made no effort to
obtain the presence of a co-defendant who was in federal custody
in another state. The co-defendant's testimony at a preliminary
hearing was used at the defendant's trial to incriminate him."
Denial of the right to confrontation was also found in Smith v.
Illinois,'1 when the court sustained the prosecution's objection to
the defense's cross-examination of the government's principle
witness, an informer, regarding his true name and address"
Similarly, in Parker v. Gladden,'175 the Court found a denial of this
right where the bailiff had made statements to jurors that the
defendant was a "wicked fellow," that he was guilty, and that if
there was anything wrong in finding the defendant guilty, the
Supreme Court would correct it.
176
The military has embraced equivalent standards in
interpreting the right to confrontation, as exemplified in United
States v. Shaffer.177 In Shaffer, the government was allowed to
introduce testimony taken at a preliminary hearing, when the
witness later refused to testify at the trial. The crux of the decision
168. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 291, 40 C.M.R. 3 (1969).
169. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
170. Contra Bruton v. United States, 291 U.S. 123 (1968) (error to admit co-
defendant's confession even with limiting instructions).
171. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
172. Compare Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965).
173. 390 U.S. 129 (1967).
174. See Brookhard v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1965); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S.
687 (1931).
175. 385 U.S. 363 (1966).
176. Compare Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
177. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 362,40 C.M.R. 74 (1969).
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was complete opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the
previous hearing. Where the opportunity to cross-examine a
witness is made available at a pre-trial hearing, the testimony of
the witness at such hearing, if it is a "full-fledged hearing," will
be admissible at the trial, 178 assuming that the witness is
unavailable in fact. 79 United States v. Jacobyls' deterrmined that
the accused has a constitutional right to be present during the
taking of depositions under the confrontation clause. Since the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are applicable to the armed
forces, a defendant in a military trial is entitled to subpoena
witnesses.""8
The providence of guilty pleas, an area which has recently
attracted the attention of the Supreme Court, was subjected to
vigorous standards in McCarthy v. United States.18 2 McCarthy
decided that the district judge, who accepted the defendant's guilty
plea without personally addressing the defendant to determine that
the plea was voluntary and with an understanding of the nature
of the charge, failed to adhere to proper procedures under Rule
I I of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which deals with
the acceptance of guilty pleas.les
Such inquiries were standard in the military and have since
been extended in their scope by several recent decisions. United
States v. Lewis'84 found that there had been a proper initial
inquiry into the providence of the accused's guilty plea. But, when
the defense counsel declared in a post-finding statement that a
178. United States v. Ledbetter, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 67, 39 C.M.R. 67 (1968).
179. United States v. Obligacion, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 36, 37 C.M.R. 300 (1967)
(inadmissible when witness shown to be over 100 miles away, as required by statute, but
not available in fact); United States v. Burrow, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 94, 36 C.M.R. 250 (1966)
(testimony of two French nationals who testified at Article 32 Pre-trial Investigation
admissible when they refused to appear for trial voluntarily and were not amenable to
process).
180. 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1969).
181. United States v. Sweeney, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 599, 34 C.M.R. 379 (1964). See
United States v. Manos, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 10, 37 C.M.R. 274 (1967) (error for convening
authority to not either obtain witnesses or take depositions when defense made diligent
request for their presence); Christian, Right to Compulsory Process, 19 JAG J. 31 (1964).
182. 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
183. See Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831 (1969) (McCarthy to have
prospective application only); Boykin v. Alabama, U.S. 238 (1969) (reversible error in
state court acceptance of guilty plea without inquiry into voluntariness and understanding
of plea); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (proper inquiry by the judge will leave
a record adequate for any review later sought).
184. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 287, 39 C.M.R. 287 (1969).
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defense was available but was not asserted due to inability to
obtain proof, a further inquiry should have been made. United
States v. Pinkston',5 found an inadequate inquiry into the
voluntariness of the accused's guilty plea when the accused, in a
statement in extenuation and mitigation, indicated that he had
participated in the offenses because of threats against his life and
against those of his son and fiancee.' The military has
understandably condemned inquiry into the providence of guilty
pleas during a mass arraignment, 87 agreements to plead guilty in
exchange for a pre-trial agreement limiting the amount of
punishment, but specifically waiving any issue of speedy trial or
due process, 8 and placing the accused under oath for the inquiry
and advising him that his answers, if proven false, might result
in a charge of perjury against him.1 89
Fundamental violations of an accused's right to due process
have been found on several occasions in dealing with the handling
of the accused either before or during his trial, as well as when
dealing with the trial itself. United States v. Nelson'9 9 determined
that the accused had been punished without due process. Before
trial, the accused was placed in the brig in a combat zone to await
trial, performed hard labor with convicted criminals, and kept the
same schedule hours, and work assignments as sentenced
personnel. The only distinction between the accused and the
sentenced prisoners consisted of the arm-bands worn.
Some of the recent cases reveal abuses during trial in both
civilian and military courtrooms. Miller v. Pate' condemned a
185. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 261, 39 C.M.R. 261 (1969).
186. See also United States v. Care, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 535, 40 C.M.R. 247 (1969)
(requiring that elements of offense be explained to accused and his actions and intentions
ascertained); United States v. Johnson, 18 U.S.C.M.R. 436, 40 C.M.R. 148 (1969)
(requiring Military judge to inquire into the facts supporting each element when
questioning the accused regarding providency of his guilty plea); United States v. Leggs,
18 U.S.C.M.A. 245, 39 C.M.R. 245 (1969) (error to grant two continuances to obtain
medical reports bearing on accused's mental capactiy and then, at third meeting of court,
accept a guilty plea without more than a pro forma inquiry into its providency); United
States v. Boberg, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 401, 38 C.M.R. 199 (1968) (upholding adequacy of
inquiry into guilty plea to unpremeditated murder without accused's categorical admission
of his guilt).
187. United States v. Pratt, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 464, 38 C.M.R. 262 (1968).
188. Id.; United States v. Cummings, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 376, 38 C.M.R. 74 (1968).
189. United States v. Simpson and Mabry, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 44, 37 C.M.R. 308
(1967).
190. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 177, 39 C.M.R. 177 (1969).
191. 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
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deliberate misrepresentation by the prosecution through the use of
paint-stained girl's pants, and reference to them as "bloody
shorts," in a prosecution for the murder of an eight-year old girl
during a sex attack. Sheppard v. Maxwell z and Estes v. Texas9 3
both condemned inherent prejudice against the defendant as a
result of failure of the court to control prejudicial publicity and
disruptive influences in the courtroom. A military counterpart was
United States v. West,' where the accused was found to have
been denied his right to a fair trial. He was confined in a small
dark cell of solid concrete and steel, denied all furniture, reading
material and hot meals during pre-trial confinement without any
justification for such strenuous restriction. He was then
transported to and from the court in a box on the rear of a truck,
and was continually surrounded by guards, despite the ruling of
the law officer to modify security to make it less conspicuous. In
addition, he was required to dress and undress in the presence of
the court members, to appear in court in a prison uniform or
fatigue clothing and denied the opportunity to shave.'95
Double jeopardy has been analyzed by the Supreme Court on
several occasions, most recently in North Carolina v. Pearce.'
The Court held that, upon re-conviction, any sentence imposed
which is more severe in length than the initial sentence must carry
with it affirmative reasons by the judge allowing it. Benton v.
Maryland"7 determined that the state court had violated the
accused's right to protection against double jeopardy by re-trying
him for larceny. He had been acquitted of larceny, but convicted
of burglary at an earlier trial, which was subsequently set aside
on appeal. Termination of proceedings and discharge of the jury
before evidence is presented, on the grounds that the government
is not prepared to go forward with its case, does not cause
jeopardy to attach.9 8 But, once the government has presented
evidence, a termination of the proceedings will cause jeopardy to
192. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
193. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
194. 12 U.S.C.M.A. 670,31 C.M.R. 256 (1962).
195. See also United States v. Lewis, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 145, 36 C.M.R. 301 (1966),
holding that the accused was denied the right to a fair trial as a result of bitter antagonism
between counsel during the trial resulting in the disclosure of matters prejudicial to the
accused.
196. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
197. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
198. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964).
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attach'99 unless "very extraordinary and striking circumstances"
are present0 0 Also, the proper declaration of a mistrial will not
result in the attaching of jeopardy.!0' The military case, United
States v. Waldron,2 12 found a proper declaration of mistrial when
five of the six members of the accused's court had, at a prior trial
of another accused, formed an opinion as to the credibility of an
important witness to be called in the accused's case. Dictum in
Waldron would indicate that the military would decide any other
cases in the area of double jeopardy in accordance with the
reasoning of the Supreme Court as discussed in the above cases.
F. Right to indictment by Grand Jury and Trial by Petit Jury
The fifth amendment's protection of the right to presentment
or indictment by grand jury and trial by petit jury has been the
subject of considerable discussion throughout the history of the
Supreme Court, particularly in regard to its application to the
military. However, the Court has consistently, until the advent of
O'Callahan, considered that the rights were not applicable to
those whose "status" was that of a member of the armed
forces-
2 °3
The- right to a grand jury presentment or indictment is
generally available in civilian jurisdictions.2 4 The Supreme Court
has recently focused its attention upon the right to trial by jury.
In Duncan v. Louisiana,215 the Court expounded the principle that
the right to trial by jury was available when the accused,
prosecuted for the misdemeanor offense of simple battery, would
have been entitled to a jury trial in a federal court under the sixth
amendment. He was sentenced to 60 days imprisonment and a
$150 fine, when the maximum possible sentence was 2 years
199. Fung Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962).
200. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 735 (1963) (no extraordinary circumstances
present in government serving witnesses with summons but failing to make other
arrangements to insure their presence).
201. Gori v. United States, 367, U.S. 364 (1961).
202. 15 U.S.C.M.A. 628, 36 C.M.R. 126 (1966).
203. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1 (1957); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); Burns v.
Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Dynes v. Hoover, 61
U.S. 65 (1857).
204. See generally, for example, Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 6, as amended 1966.
205. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). See C.omment, 10 ARz. L. REV: 419 (1968); Comment,
29 LA. L. REV. 118 (1968); Note, 53 MINN. L. REV. 414 (1968).
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imprisonment. Holding that trial by jury is a constitutional right
which, if tried in a federal court, would come within the sixth
amendment's guarantee as being essential to ordered liberty, the
Court found that Louisiana had unlawfully dispensed with the
right in a "serious" criminal case.206
The same reasoning has not held true when the Court has
been confronted with claims that the military should also afford
to its accuseds the right to presentment or indictment by grand
jury and trial by petit jury. Over 100 years ago, the Court in
Dynes v. Hoover"7 reflected on the applicability of the
Constitutional proviso authorizing Congress to prescribe
regulations for the trial of military personnel,2"' declaring
that the power to do so is given without any connection with
it and the 3d article of the constitution defining the judicial
power of the United States; indeed, that the two powers are
entirely independent of each other 9
Ex parte Milligan,210 decided but nine years later, reiterated the
declaration of Dynes, reasoning that
[t]he sixth amendment affirms that 'in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial by an impartial jury,' language broad enough to
embrace all persons and cases; but the fifth, recognizing the
necessity of an indictment, or presentment, before any one can
be held to answer for high crimes, 'excepts cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service,
in time of war or public danger;' and the framers of the
Constitution, doubtless, meant to limit the right of trial by
jury, in the sixth amendment, to those persons who were
subject to indictment or presentment in the fifth!"
206. See Destefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (holding Duncan inapplicable to
trials not already begun before the date of the decision); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg.
Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968) (holding not "serious" enough to warrant a jury trial a contempt
prosecution with a maximum imposable punishment of ten days and a relatively light fine);
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (extending Duncan to a contempt case with a two
year possible sentence).
207. 61 U.S. 65 (1857).
208. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 14.
209. 61 U.S. at 79.
210. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
211. Id. at 123; See also Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1895) (construing "when
in actual service in time of war or public danger" to modify only "militia"); but see, State
ex rel. Lanng v. Long, 136 La. 1, 66 So. 377 (1914) (allowing court-martial jurisdiction
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Exparte Quirin2 2 confirmed the doctrine that military courts
are not courts in the sense of the Judiciary Article of the
Constitution, thus making presentment by grand jury and trial by
a jury of the vicinage where the crime was commited
inapplicable.2 13 To servicemen, the Court has reasoned, trial by
court-martial constitutes due process of law, regardless of the fact
that he has no right to indictment by grand jury or trial by petit
jury 1  The same line of reasoning has continued to prevail in the
most recent of the Supreme Court's cases, excluding O'Callahan,
without deviation.2 5 It is interesting to note that Justice Douglas,
who wrote the opinion for the majority in O'Callahan, based his
reasoning in that decision upon the theory that to allow the
military to have jurisdiction over servicemen in non-service
oriented crimes would be a denial of the accused's right to
indictment by grand jury and trial by petit jury. However, his
dissenting opinion in Burns v. Wilson,"6 would indicate that he
once conceded the inapplicability of such rights to military
accuseds. In addition, Justices Douglas and Black would seem to
have reversed their apparent concession that "status" is sufficient
of unauthorized absentee from militia drill meeting during peactime); State ex rel.
Madigan v. Wagener, 74 Minn. 518, 77 N.W. 424 (1898) (allowing court-martial
jurisdiction of unauthorized absentee from militia meeting during peacetime).
212. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
213. See Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1 (1921); In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126 (1900); Ex
parte Vallandigham, I Wall. 243 (1863).
214. See United States ex rel. Franch v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 326 (1922); Reaves v.
Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, (1911).
215. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14, n. 5, (1955) (refusing to
allow jurisdiction over discharged serviceman; majority opinion by Justice Black to the
effect that "there need be no indictment for such military offenses as Congress can
authorize military tribunals to try under its Article I power to make rules to govern the
armed forces."); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 152 (1953); Dissenting opinion by Justices
Douglas and Black provided:
Of course the military tribunals are not governed by the procedure for trials
prescribed in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. This is the meaning of Exparte
Quirin, . . . holding that indictment by grand jury and trial by jury are not
constitutional requirements for trials before military commissions.
Welchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 127 (1950) ("The right to trial by jury guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment is not applicable to trials by courts-martial or military
commissions."). But see, Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960)
(refusing to allow military jurisdiction over wife of overseas soldier in a non-capital case
on the theory that she was denied her right to indictment by grand jury and trial by petit
jury); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (refusing to allow military jursidiction over wife
of overseas soldier in a capital case on the theory that she was denied her right to
indictment by grand jury and trial by petit jury).
216. See note 215, supra.
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to allow the military jurisdiction over a serviceman, based upon
a comparison of their opinions in Burns, Toth217 and O'Callahan.
The military has long considered itself divorced from the
requirement that military accused be granted the rights of
indictment by grand jury and trial by petit jury.!18 While a court
composed of officers, with enlisted members at the accused's
request, may not accord with the civilian counterpart of a jury of
one's peers, it must be kept in mind that the military operates its
system of justice with dual goals-unlike its civilian counterpart.
In addition to meting out justice, the armed forces must provide
a system by which the safety of the country is insured through the
provision of an ever-available and well-disciplined military force.
The Constitution has, in accordance with this goal, specifically
exempted military tribunals from the requirement that they be
composed of petit juries of one's peers 9
While little mention has been made of the fact, an analysis
of the provisions available under federal law and under military
law would indicate that the military's counterpart to an
indictment by grand jury far exceeds in fairness to the accused its
civilian counterpart. In practical effect, the federal rules often
provide nothing but a "rubber stamp" process for grand juries.
Neither the accused nor his attorney have a right to be present at
grand jury proceedings, much less to contest the evidence. No
evidence is given on the defendant's behalf, and the proceedings
are relatively secret until the outcome is announced.
2
On the other hand, an Article 32 pre-trial investigation,
which is required to be convened before any charges may be
referred to a General Court-Martial, affords a full inquiry into the
truth of the matter. 221 The accused is required to be present and
217. Id.
218. United States v. Crawford, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3, cert. denied 380
U.S. 970 (1965); United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
219. See Exparte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (1866).
220. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6, as amended 1966.
The Grand Jury
(d) Who May be Present. Attorneys for the government, the witness unde.
examination, interpreters when needed and, for the purpose of taking the
evidence, a stenographer or operator of a recording device may be present
while the grand jury is in session, but no person other than the jurors may be
present while the grand jury is deliberating or voting.
221. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1964).
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allowed to have either military counsel provided free of charge or
retained civilian counsel. He is afforded full opportunity to cross-
examine all witnesses against him if they are available and to call
witnesses either in defense of the charges or in extenuation or
mitigation of the charges. He is also given the opportunity to
make a statement either under oath or unsworn, without cross-
examination, or to remain silent, according to his desires.222
Furthermore, the recommendations made by the investigating
officer may result in referral to a Special Court-Martial, other
inferior proceedings, or dismissal of the charges.22
The Court of Military Appeals has been most careful in
requiring that any testimony taken at a pre-trial hearing be taken
under circumstances displaying that the proceeding was a "full-
fledged hearing" before the testimony is admissible at a later trial
upon the unavailability of the witness.22' If the testimony of a
witness at such a proceeding is not complete, but consists of only
what the transcriber considered material, it is inadmissible at a
later trial.225 But failure to cross-examine a witness, if the
opportunity is provided, will not detract from the admissibility of
the testimony at a later trial. 22 However, the government will not
be allowed to introduce the prior testimony of a witness without
a showing that the witness is unavailable in fact.27
III. JURISDICTION AND THE "STATUS" QUESTION
The military courts have been the vanguard of the
serviceman's precious individual rights, as seen in the previous
section. Attention will now be focused on some practical
implications of the Supreme Court's decision to shed "status" as
the jurisdictional determinative.-
222. Id.
223. Id. See United States v. Payne, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 455, 31 C.M.R. 41 (1961)
(failure to object at trial to any alleged deficiencies in the pre-trial proceedings waives the
defect).
224. United States v. Ledbetter, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 67, 39 C.M.R. 67 (1968)
(inadmissible where Scottish women who testified at investigation later refused to testify
at trial and accused was represented by counsel and afforded all rights at investigation,
but not a "full-fledged" Article 32 Investigation); United States v. Worden, 17
U.S.C.M.A. 486, 38 C.M.R. 284 (1968) (denial of right to interview witnesses before they
testified in Article 32 Investigation resulted in denial of effective assistance of counsel).
225. United States v. Norris, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 574, 37 C.M.R. 199 (1967).
226. United States v. Burrow, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 94, 36 C.M.R. 250 (1966).
227. United States v. Howard, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 162, 37 C.M.R. 426 (1967); United




Justices Harlan, Stewart and White, dissenting in
O'Callahan, recognized that court-martial jurisdiction had,
throughout the history of the armed forces, always been founded
upon the status of the accused as "a person who can be regarded
as falling within the term 'land and naval Forces,' rather than
upon the nature of the offense. ' 2 8 Rejecting the majority's
discussion of the interests at stake between the individual and the
government, the dissenting justices would allow Congress the
power to determine the jurisdictional limitations of military
courts.
Dynes v. Hoover"9 provided the first clear interpretation of
the constitutional requirements under the Judicial Article as
applied to the military, holding that military defendants, due to
their status as members of the armed forces, were subject to the
legislative enactments of the Congress in regard to trials in
military courts. 230 The idea that military jurisdiction over an
accused was based upon his status as a member of the armed
forces continued unchallenged for decades, 23' O'Callahan
representing the first break in the long line of cases upholding
military jurisdiction over a serviceman without reference to the
228. 395 U.S. at 275.
229. 61 U.S. 65 (1857).
230. See generally Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1895) (dealing with militiamen);
Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19 (1827) (dealing with militiamen); vise v. Withers, 3 Cranch.
331 (1806) (dealing with militiamen).
231. See generally United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); Burns
v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953); Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376 (1920); Reaves v.
Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296 (1911); Franklin v. United States, 216 U.S. 559 (1910); Grafton
v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907); Exparte Mason, 105 U.S. 696 (1881); Coleman v.
Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509 (1879); Exparte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 123 (1886) held:
Every one connected with these branches of the public service is amenable to
the jurisdiction which Congress has created for their government, and, while
thus serving, surrenders his right to be tried by the civil courts. All other
persons, citizens of states where the courts are open, if charged with crime,
are guaranteed the inestimable privilege of trial by jury.
The military has kept pace with the "status" decisions on various fronts. See United
States v. Ginyard, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 512, 37 C.M.R. 132 (1967) (discharge operated as a
bar to subsequent trial for offenses occuring during the enlistment prior to discharge);
United States v. Hall, 17 U.S.M.C.A. 88, 37 C.M.R. 352 (1967) (no jurisdiction without
some semblance of conformity with an induction ceremony, absent subsequent conduct and
tacit submission to military authority); United States v. Schuering, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 324,
36 C.M.R. 480 (1966) (finding reservist on duty subject to court-martial jurisdiction as
subject to military law at time of offense and time of trial).
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nature of the offense. While many'may mourn the passing of the
status consideration in determining jurisdiction, its passing
appears to be final. The Court of Military Appeals, dealing with
the question of jurisdiction for the first time since the O'Callahan
decision was rendered, followed the standards set forth by the
Supreme Court in finding no jurisdiction present to authorize trial
in a military court in United States v. Borys.2 32 Borys, an Army
captain convicted in 1965 of two counts of rape, two of burglary,
three of robbery, two of attempted rape, five of sodomy, and one
each of attempted sodomy, housebreaking and larceny, was given
the benefit of a retroactive application of the O'Callahan decision
by the Court. of Military Appeals. Over a blistering dissent by
Chief Judge Quinn, the Court of Military Appeals found that
Borys' crimes were not "service-connected." More recent cases
indicate few offenses committed "off-base" will be considered
"service-connected. 233
Presumably, the Supreme Court will continue to adhere to its
previous rulings that civilian review of military convictions is
limited to questioning the military's jurisdiction and whether the
military has exceeded its constitutional powers, without reviewing
the evidence presented.2 34 The most recent application of the
232. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 545, 40 C.M.R. 257 (1969). Bory's offenses occurcd during leave
time; his victims were civilian women, and the crimes were civilian in nature, the court
found. Decided at the same time, again on a retroactive basis, was United States v.
Prather, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 560, 40 C.M.R. 272 (1969). Prather, an Army Private, had been
convicted of the wrongful appropriation of an auto, robbing a gas station, and resisting
arrest. See United States v. Beeker, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969), holding
that the military could prosecute the accused for marijuana offenses which were not
cognizable in a civilian court, finding a service connection in the possible effects of usage
of marijuana by servicemen, but not those for which the civilian courts were available for
prosecution. The retroactive application of O'Callahan by the Court of Military Appeals
in each case undoubtedly will result in considerable bonfusion in determining the future of
those convicted prior to O'Callahan.
233. See United States v. Boyd, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 581, 40 C.M.R. 293 (1969)
(marijuana and narcotic offenses "'service-connected" regardless of location of
commission); United States v. Cochran, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 40 C.M.R. 300 (1969)
(larceny not "service-connected" absent evidence of circumstances).
234. See 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1964); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I (1957); United States
ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953); Madsen
v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952); Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122 (1950); Hiatt v.
Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950); United States ex rel. French v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 326 (1922);
Collins v. McDonald, 258 U.S. 416 (1922); Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U.S. 11 (1921); Kahn
v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1 (1921); Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376 (1920); Reaves v.
Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296 (1911); Franklin v. United States, 216 U.S. 559 (1910); Grafton
v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907); Bishop v. United States, 197 U.S. 334 (1905);
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doctrine that civilian review is so limited was in United States v.
A ugenblick,23 where the Court held that the Court of Claims was
not empowered to review a court-martial conviction in which the
claimed errors were not of constitutional magnitude.
B. Practical Considerations Involved in Determining
Jurisdiction
Military jurisdiction should be based upon the status of the
accused as a member of the armed forces, rather than upon a
determination of whether the offense alleged to have been
committed is service-connected. A great many factors, in
conjunction with the expanded rights accorded in military trials,
operate as benefits to an accused, in contradiction to Justice
Douglas' affirmation that "the military trial is marked by the
age-old manifest destiny of retributive justice."' 6
Not the least significant factor is the relationship which exists
between military installations and the adjacent communities. As
would be expected, military installations are often faced with
innumerable problems with their personnel who venture into the
nearby communities. What happens when the nearby communities
are hostile toward the presence of the military? Quite obviously,
the serviceman suffers. Not only is he unwanted in the
community, but he is often the victim of unfriendly local courts.
Further, the court calendar may be so crowded that his eventual
trial is so distant in time from the date of the offense that his
standing in the military is jeopardized, either through his absence
awaiting trial or his being retained by the military for the civilian
trial. In addition, the cost to the community to prosecute this
often non-resident offender is many times heavy, particularly
where the neighboring community is rather small. This factor does
not tend to ingratiate the serviceman with local citizens. Granted,
McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49 (1902);-Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902);
In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126 (1900); Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553, (1897); Mullan
v. United States, 140 U.S. 240 (1891); Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887);
Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167 (1886); Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 (1885); Wales v.
Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885); Keyes v. United States, 109 U.S. 336 (1883); Ex pare
Mason, 105 U.S. 696 (1881); Exparte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879); Exparte Vallandigham,
68 U.S. 243 (1863); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65 (1857); Exparte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193
(1830).
235. 395 U.S. 348 (1969).
236. 395 U.S. at 266.
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these situations do not always occur, but, would not the
community and the serviceman be better off if the community is
allowed to waive jurisdiction over the serviceman to the military,
thus alleviating a burden on both the community and the military
installation?
Another consideration is the relationship between the service
and the individual serviceman-offender. Did not the military order
the serviceman to the scene of the crime? How often is the
serviceman-offender a local citizen? He usually owes his presence
in the geographical area to the military, a factor which may not
particularly enamor him of the military, but which nevertheless is
a contributing factor in his ability to have committed the crime
in that area. If he is to be bound over by civilian authorities for
trial, his presence must somehow be insured. Assuming that he is
confined by civilian authorities, he becomes utterly useless to the
armed forces. Should he be confined by military authorites, he
will at least be able to continue to serve his obligation to the
military. And, if the military has him confined, why not allow the
military to prosecute him? If he is not confined, but released upon
bond or upon his own recognizance, he must then be detained for
the trial. This burden falls upon the armed forces. Orders must
be changed and workloads re-arranged to accommodate the
civilians until the date of trial arrives. Until he is convicted, the
armed services may incur financial obligations to the serviceman-
offender, assuming he was not in an unauthorized absence status
when apprehended for the crime. This conclusion is particularly
evident where the serviceman is acquitted by the civilian court,
thus possibly entitling him to back pay from the military for time
during which he was of no service to the armed forces.
Furthermore, if the military is allowed to retain jurisdiction of the
serviceman, it will then know within a reasonable degree of
certainty when and if the accused will again be available to
continue serving his obligation, a factor which is often extremely
uncertain when dealing with civilian courts. Thus, the military can
plan in advance where the accused will be sent upon completion
of his disciplinary status. An interesting point is this: What
happens when the serviceman's so-called "non-service-connected"
offense is committed while he is on a period of unauthorized
absence from the military? Is he not then committing an offense
against the military at the same time that he commits his
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"civilian" crime? Should not he be punished at one trial for all
the known offenses, rather than at separate trials; and, should not
this one trial take place in a military court?
Another advantage to the accused in having his case heard
before a military court is the possibility that the convening
authority may agree to enter into a "pre-trial agreement" to limit
the amount of punishment to be imposed in return for the
accused's guilty plea to the offense charged.P7 Such an agreement,
which must be initiated by the accused, has the effect of not only
reducing the amount of time and money spent by the government
in a prosecution, but insures the accused that his punishment will
have an agreed-upon maximum limitation. The accused may then
present to the court, which is unaware of the existence of the
agreement or its terms, evidence in extenuation and mitigation in
an effort to secure a sentence even less stringent that the agreed-
upon maximum. The process is similar to plea bargaining in
civilian courts. Such an agreement has no effect upon the review
process; thus, the accused may have his sentence reduced even
further upon appeal, if the appellate court feels that error in the
record justified such reduction or if the sentence is still unduly
harsh.
Of prime importance to the accused is the availability of
defense counsel free of cost in the military. While some civilian
jurisdictions may supply defense counsel free of charge, the
accused may at times be required to display his complete financial
inability in order to obtain the free services of a public defender.
Suppose the jurisdiction does not have salaried public defenders,
but chooses court appointed counsel from the local bar
association, perhaps upon a rotation basis. The possible
consequence is that the accused may be defended by one without
the time or inclination to devote himself fully to representing the
accused. In addition, civilian jurisdictions may not be able to
provide counsel as rapidly as can the military, since military
lawyers are present for the stated purpose of serving military
accuseds. While few would argue that the accused should be able
to "forum shop" in order to find a jurisdiction which will provide
him the best possible representation, the counsel provided by the
military free of charge serves as a reasonable and workable
237. Infante, Avoiding the Pitfalls of Pretrial Agreements, 22 JAG J. 3 (1967).
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alternative to the dilemma. The accused in a military General
Court-Martial is guaranteed an attorney provided by the military
free of charge; in a Special Court-Martial, he is guaranteed an
attorney, again free of charge, unless such cannot be obtained due
to "physical conditions or military exigencies. ' 8 It is difficult to
imagine a situation existing within the boundaries of the United
States in which such conditions would exist to prevent the accused
from being represented by a military lawyer.
Not only is the accused faced with the risk that the
jurisdiction will not provide him counsel free of charge, he also
must face the risk that, without counsel, he may not be able to
appeal his conviction in a civil court. Even if he is able to obtain
an appeal, the result may be forthcoming only after a considerable
outlay of funds on his part. The area of free transcripts of the trial
for appellate purposes has been the subject of considerable
concern in the Supreme Court recently. Gardner v. California"9
declared that an indigent petitioner who applied for habeas
corpus, and whose petition had been denied in the lower court,
was automatically entitled to a free transcript of that proceeding
to aid him in preparing and presenting a new petition to the state
supreme court. Long v. District Court of Iowa, In and For Lee
Count2 40 condemned the refusal of the lower court to provide the
defendant a free transcript of habeas corpus proceedings held in
his case when the transcript was available and could easily have
been furnished to him. The Court has consistently held that the
interposing of any financial conditions between an indigent
prisoner and his exercise of his right to sue for his liberty is a
denial of equal protection. 24' And, although the Supreme Court
has acted in the area of free counsel for appellate purposes, the
providing thereof is far from being a requirement.2 42
238. 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1968), amending 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1964).
239. 393 U.S. 367 (1969).
240. 385 U.S. 192 (1966).
241. See Draper v. Washington; 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477
(1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
242. See Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967) (inadequate representation on
review when counsel failed to file record of trial for appellate purposes); Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (inadequate representation when appointed defense counsel
prepared no brief, but informed the court by letter that he found no merit in appealing);
Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1967) (inadequate representation when defense counsel
prepared a motion for a new trial and notice of appeal and then withdrew them, thus
leaving the appellate court without sufficient matters to consider on defendant's behalf);
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Unlike civilian proceedings, the military provides for an
automatic appeal, free of charge, in any case where the sentence
imposed, as approved by the convening authority and supervisory
authority, includes a punitive discharge from the armed forces,
confinement for one year or more, any greater punishment, or
when an issue of law is presented and an appeal is granted. This
initial appeal is to a Court of Military Review, established by the
Judge Advocate General of the particular service, and composed
of not less than three attorneys 43 A further appeal to the Court
of Military Appeals may be granted the accused with good cause,
again free of charge. The Court of Military Appeals is composed
of three judges appointed from civilian life by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate for 15-year terms" Upon
each appeal, the accused is entitled, upon his request, to appellate
defense counsel free of charge provided by the military. The
accused, as in the military trial, is entitled to retain civilian
defense counsel to represent him on appeal.
245
Examination of the foregoing factors would indicate that it
may behoove the accused to appear before a military court-
martial rather than a civilian court in the jurisdiction wherein the
crime is alleged to have been committed. Certainly, the accused
would be accorded a greater degree of certainty regarding his
status before the law should he appear in a military court, as
opposed to his status before one of the different judicial systems
present in the myriad of jurisdictions within the United States.
Little argument can be presented, nor can any justification be
offered, in support of the isolated instances in which the military
has deviated from fundamental fairness. Such instances will occur
in any system of justice, it would seem, the military being no
exception. Perfection, that ever-evasive goal of every judicial
system, will probably always exist as a goal and nothing more,
whether the system be that of the military or a civilian
jurisdiction. The military judicial system, unlike its civilian
counterpart, is faced with a dual objective in its pursuit of
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (revocation of probation and imposition of sentence
in proceeding without defense counsel or offer to appoint defense counsel invalid). See also
Sherman, Judicial Review of Military Determinations and the Exhaustion of Remedies
Requirement, 55 VA. L.R. 483 (1969); Comment, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 786.
243. 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1968), amending 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1964).
244. 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1968), amending 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1964).
245. 10 U.S.C. § 870 (1968), amending 10 U.S.C. § 870 (1964).
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perfection. Not only must it attempt to provide justice for military
accuseds, but it must do so within the confines of the ultimate
goal of the armed forces, that of the preservation and protection
of the country for whose benefit it was created. The need for more
stringent discipline in military life than in civilian life is quite
evident. For that reason, the military includes among its list of
punishable offenses a considerable number of offenses unknown at
common law. Rather than being subjected to criticism for its
shortcomings, it would appear that the military judicial system
deserves praise for its never-ending battle to provide justice to
those service members within its jurisdictional cognizance.
IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion concerning the expansion of
constitutional rights in military trials would indicate that the
military is doing its utmost to keep pace with its civilian
counterparts. 246 Not only has the military applied the recent
constitutional interpretations of the Supreme Court in a blanket
fashion, but it has also anticipated the Court in various areas,
resulting in an even broader expansion of rights in favor of the
military accused. In a word, Justice Douglas' indictment of the
military system of justice4 was unjustifiable.
Recent interpretations concerning advice as to counsel,
provided through Miranda and ensuing cases, have been applied
to military courts in every facet. The result has been the
imposition of strict standards upon government interrogators
regarding the nature of the warnings given, the rights of a suspect
to terminate questioning or request an attorney, and the
application of the right to counsel during "critical stages" of
prosecution. The military system appears far ahead of civilian
jurisdictions in the area of advice concerning self-incrimination,
since it requires considerably more detailed warnings, delineates
the circumstances under which an accused's statements may be
held inadmissible, and provides advice during requests for
handwriting exemplars, an area in which the Supreme Court has
246. Quinn, Some Comparisons Between Courts-Martial and Civilian Practice, 15
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1240 (1968); Birnbaum, The Effect of Recent Supreme Court Decisions
on Military Law, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 153 (1967); Note, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 435
(1967). See also, Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REV. 249
(1968).
247. 395 U.S. 258, 263-267.
[Vol. 7
THE WAYWARD SERVICEMAN
found warnings unnecessary. Clearly, the military has adhered to
civilian standards in determining the presence of custodial
interrogations, the voluntary nature of a suspect's statement and
impeachment through the use of illegally obtained, statements.
In the conduct of searches and seizures, the military has
again required compliance with the standards determined by the
Supreme Court regarding probable cause, standing to object,
"stop and frisk" regarding the actual occurrence arrest, consent
searches, and questions regarding the actual occurance of a
search. An area in which the military has surpassed civilian
standards by a considerable margin is that of speedy trial.
Although military courts are constituted differently than
civilian courts, the military has kept pace with civilian decisions
regarding impartiality of members and judge, absence of influence
upon the court and judge, confrontation of witnesses, examination
into the providence of guilty pleas, adequacy of measures to insure
the ultimate fairness of trials and preservation of due process, and
the protection against double jeopardy. The military would seem
to have surpassed civilian jurisdictions as a whole in the area of
insuring the accused adequate representation by counsel. Although
the military does not, by constitutional fiat, provide indictment by
grand jury and trial by petit jury to an accused, the substitute
offered would appear to provide a more modern alternative.
Article 32 pre-trial investigation provides benefits to an accused
which will seldom be found in civilian indictment proceedings.
And, with the option of appearing before a court-martial board
or a military judge, a workable alternative to the civilian
courterpart has been provided.
Taking into consideration the expanded rights now available
to military accuseds, in conjunction with the practical
considerations which as a whole provide additional benefits to the
accused, one would question why the Supreme Court has decided
that military jurisdiction shall henceforth be limited to service-
connected crimes. Certainly the military will, for some time, be
plagued by numerous challenges regarding its jurisdiction which
will require ad hoc interpretations of the term "service-
connected." As Justice Harlan stated in his dissent to
O'Callahan, the law has been thrown into a "demoralizing state
1970]
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of uncertainty. 2 8 It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court has
scuttled the time-tested old rule, replacing it with a new one of
dubious merit.
248. Id. at 275.
